DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER

OFFICE OF TRAINING

FINANCIAL FRAUD INSTITUTE

CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE (CDC) REPORT

CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS TRAINING PROGRAM

September 28, 2000

Curriculum Conference Development Report
for the proposed
Criminal Intelligence/Research Analyst Training Initiative

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Curriculum Development Conference Report

In responding to several requests from FLETC's participating organizations, a Curriculum Development Conference (CDC) was hosted by the Financial Fraud Institute (FFI) to address the perceived need for training for Criminal Intelligence Analysts and Criminal Research Analysts (job series GS-132 and GS-1801, respectively). This is a report of the activities, discussions, and conclusions of the conference.

Structure of the Conference

The Curriculum Development Conference was authorized in mid-July, was convened on Tuesday, August 22, and ended Wednesday, August 23. A total of 20 persons attended the conference. Attendees included eight representatives from on-site agencies and FLETC, four off-site agency representatives, and eight representatives from agencies which are involved with either the training or hiring of intelligence analysts (i.e. FinCEN NDIC, DEA, FRB, NWCCC, CDX and Mercyhurst College). Dr. Bob Schaller, Program Specialist for FFI, was conference facilitator and Mr. Bob Gibbs, Senior Instructor in FFI, has been tentatively assigned project lead for pursuing this initiative. Attachment "A" is a list of conference participants.

Objective of the Conference

The preliminary goal of the CDC was to discuss and design the framework of a training program that would meet the needs of journey-level intelligence/research analyst of FLETC's Participating Organizations. However, as the conference evolved, it became obvious that there was a much more critical need for training at the entry level. Intermediate and advanced training programs should be considered a separate initiative to be addressed later. Attachment "B" is an original agenda of discussion items for the conference.

Summary of Conference Recommendations

The consensus of the participants of the conference was that entry-level training for Criminal Intelligence/Research Analysts should be developed and presented as a joint venture between the FLETC and its Department of Treasury Participating Organizations. Although a consensus was not reached as to the scope of training, the majority opinion was that a three or four week training program would meet the needs of most Participating Organizations.

Background Information

Prior to this conference, Mr. Bob Gibbs of FFI attended a Generic Intelligence Training Initiative (GITI) Conference at the Justice Training Center at Quantico, Virginia. The purpose of the GITI is to develop and publish a set of training standards for all intelligence analysts. This initiative, which is included in this report as Attachment "C", is part of the General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan which has been sanctioned and approved by the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, and other Federal department heads.

The General Counterdrug Intelligence Program dated February 2000, provides national, interagency and international guidance and is included as Attachment "D" of this report. Therein, on pages 9 and 10, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center is identified as a potential

training site for Analytic Personnel Development and Training.

The purpose of the General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) is to "establish a drug intelligence framework that supports operators in the field, improves Federal, state and local relationships, and responds to policymakers' needs as they formulate counterdrug policy, tasking and resource decisions. ...[T]he GCIP will facilitate the appropriate and timely exchange of information between the intelligence and drug law enforcement communities, taking care to respect law and regulation, but will not change agency authorities or the laws governing interagency relationships." The consensus of opinion at the conference was that any training developed as a result of this initiative would carefully adhere to the principles and standards defined in the GITI and GCIP.

Discussion

The general pattern of the conference revolved around a discussion of the type of training needed, training design and implementation procedures, the order of training courses/topics, availability of developmental and presentation resources, the scope of training and methodologies of training. The only contentious part of the discussion was a difference of opinion as to the scope of training. The participant representing FinCEN expressed his agency's need for very comprehensive basic training to include legal, behavioral, and general law enforcement courses. It was estimated that such a program would be of seven or eight weeks duration. Most other participants expressed the opinion that the training should address only the position-specific aspect of the intelligence/research analysts, including the intelligence gathering and analytical processes and application of the technical tools of the job. Such a training scope would reduce the duration of the proposed training program to no more than four weeks. Although a consensus of opinion was not reached, the recommendations of this report represent a majority opinion.

The recommendations of the conference are for the design, development, and implementation of a Basic Intelligence Analyst Training Program to be presented at the FLETC. Several current governmental initiatives including the General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan and the Generic Intelligence Initiative will impact on the design and development of the proposed training program but at the same time may provide guidance and funding resources. The proposed program will be designed to complement and implement these two initiatives. Because the FLETC's Participating Organizations (with the single exception of the U.S. Customs Service) do not presently enroll in a viable basic intelligence analysis training program, it was recommended that entry-level training should be the thrust of developmental efforts.

The conference included the development of a training model which will serve as a foundation for providing FLETC Participating Organizations with adequate entry-level training for intelligence/research analysts. Participants of the proposed program should receive appropriate training to enable them to function as an entry-level criminal intelligence/research analysts. It is anticipated that an intermediate/advanced program for the intelligence analyst series will need to be developed within three years.

Other Identified Training Sources

The CDC identified six separate entry-level training opportunities (Following as numbers one through six) as well as other options for consideration (numbers seven through nine) to train intell/research analysts:

1. Mercyhurst College in Erie, Pennsylvania offers a Bachelor of Science degree in Intelligence Analysis. Graduates from this course are typically hired by federal agencies at the GS-7 level. Several other colleges have expressed an interest in developing a similar undergraduate curriculum. Although the graduates of the Mercyhurst program are well qualified and eagerly sought as entry level intelligence analysts, the program was perceived by the CDC participants as an academic endeavor and beyond the training needs under discussion at the conference.

2. DEA (Quantico, Virginia) offers a 10-week Basic Intelligence Analysis Course. Attendance at this course is at the present time limited to DEA personnel. This is a very well-respected training program and could, with very minor modifications, meet the broader training needs defined by FinCEN. The FinCEN expressed a need for an eight - ten week training program as being necessary to prepare their personnel to function at the entry level. Conversely, the ATF, USSS and IRS-CID expressed a reluctance to commit to such a lengthy program, feeling it exceeded their training needs. Additionally, if such a lengthy program was pursued these agencies felt they would be unable to train all the personnel for which entry-level training was required. The conference discussed the possibility that DEA could make a limited number of seats in this program available to Treasury bureaus.

3. DEA is in the process of developing a four-week Intell/Research Analyst program which will be made available to other law enforcement agencies. While the FinCEN representative expressed the opinion that a four-week course would be insufficient to meet his organization's training needs, other Treasury bureaus (ATF, IRS, USSS) expressed an interest in this possibility. However, it became quite clear that this DEA initiative will not be able to address all the training needs of each Treasury bureau. It may be considered though, as a supplemental alternative.

4. The National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) offers a one week introduction to intelligence analysis and is offered via distance learning media. This may become a prerequisite to, or an adjunct to, a basic course, but by itself is insufficient to meet the training needs of the Treasury bureaus.

5. NDIC also offers a six-week course which is now only available to Intell/Research Analysts of state and local agencies. Since the ATF, IRS-CID and USSS have expressed interest in a shorter program, perhaps minor modifications could be made to this program in order to adapt it to the needs of these agencies. Such an initiative would require

negotiations at the departmental level. Even if such accommodations were made, it is unrealistic to expect that NDIC could offer a sufficient number of training slots to significantly impact the training needs of the Treasury bureaus. It is, however, an option worthy of consideration.

6. The U.S. Customs Service (USCS) offers a six-week course at the FLETC for Customs personnel only. Although Customs has communicated that the program is not available to other agencies, perhaps this could be negotiated at the departmental level. An advantage of Customs-provided training (rather than DEA or NDIC) is that training emphasis is on financial intelligence rather than drug intelligence, a training parameter of interest to Treasury bureaus.

7. The FLETC formerly offered a two-week CIATP (Criminal Intelligence Analyst Training Program). While this program is no longer offered at the FLETC, participating agencies have indicated that, even when presented, it was not designed for entry-level analysts. The consensus of opinion at the conference was that it would be easier to develop a new program than to modify and reintroduce this one.

8. Another option discussed at the conference was to develop a broad new program at the FLETC which would meet the extensive training needs of FinCEN. Attachment "E" is a course outline, developed in the conference, for a very comprehensive basic program . Implementing this option would result in an eight/ten week basic training program.

9. The final option discussed was to develop a three/four week training program to be presented at the FLETC. The extended course content list at Attachment "E" would be selectively reduced in order to bring the program length more in line with participating agency desires.

Conference participants recommended that regardless of the training option selected, the GITI initiative and the GCIP standards should be the core of the program.

Anticipated Training Requirements

The conference participants identified a need to train about 600 Intell/Research Analysts over the next three years. IRS, ATF, USSS, and FinCEN would provide the majority of students with others coming from a variety of Federal, state and local agencies. After three years, with the backlog of training requirements fulfilled, the need for program iterations would probably drop substantially.

Required Resources

A substantial issue discussed at the conference was the availability of required resources. The FinCEN representative indicated that his agency would consider supporting this program with permanently detailed personnel if the proposed program is adequate to meet their needs. It

was also suggested that the proposed program would be appropriate for full funding through Asset Forfeiture funds, both for the purchase of classroom hardware and software as well as incurred training costs for attendance.

For this training to be developed and presented at the FLETC, there will be substantial developmental costs in addition to normal facilities requirements. Since it is doubtful that enough computer classrooms now exist to facilitate this additional training workload, the integration of an additional computer classroom is recommended. (Note: the Department of the Treasury now maintains a dedicated computer classroom at the FLETC for its Computer Investigative Specialist Program (CIS-2000). There is a possibility that CIS resources can be shared with the needs of the proposed intell/research analysts program.) Should it be necessary to procure a new classroom, estimated costs are for $80,000 in computer hardware, printers, desks, etc., and $100,000 in required software licenses. As discussed earlier, Asset Forfeiture funds may be available to offset these costs. Additionally, a need is foreseen for two additional Full Time Employees (FTE's). Again, this need may be addressed by participating agencies detailing the required staff to the FLETC to maintain the program.

Recommendations

Several options exist regarding the development and implementation of the proposed Basic Intelligence Analyst Training Program. Based on the expressed needs of the majority of our participating agencies, the Financial Fraud Institute recommends the following:

1. Implement Option #9 detailed above (development of a three/four week training program). The proposed program will include the GITI training model.

2. Negotiate at the departmental level to gain Treasury bureau access to the existing programs at DEA, NDIC and the USCS program at the FLETC.

3. Attempt to obtain Asset Forfeiture and GCIP funding to develop and present the program.

4. If possible, use the Treasury CIS-2000 classroom as the Basic Intelligence Analyst Training Program classroom.

Unresolved Issues

Several unresolved issues remain to be decided including:

1. Will the program be a FLETC basic or advanced program?

2. Which FLETC division will serve as program manager?

3. How will the program development be funded?

4. How will the classroom hardware, software and access to commercial databases be funded?

Conclusion

Although the conference lasted for only two days, there was a beneficial and generally enjoyable networking among the subject matter experts who attended. The conference ended with the optimistic expectation that a quality training program will soon be developed and available for entry-level criminal intelligence and research analysts. Attachment "F" is a distribution list for this report.

Attachment “A”

List of Participants

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Attachment “B”

Original Conference Agenda

Conference Goal

To identify specific training objectives and methodologies to be used in a training program designed to prepare computer research/intelligence analysts to effectively function at the journeyman level. This initiative is a result of recommendations by several participating organizations of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.

Conference Objectives

- Determine training program need.
- Determine training program characteristics.
- Identify who should attend training (Feds, State, Local, Industry?).
- Identify prerequisites (experience, training, equipment, other).
- Identify the Terminal Learning Objective (what the student should be able to due upon satisfactory completion of the training).
- Because much of the training in this program is already taught in various other programs, most of the development effort has already been accomplished. Emphasis, therefore, is on determining Learning Objectives to be accomplished and on selecting existing training courses to support those objectives.
- Identify Interim/Supportive Learning Objectives (satisfactory completion of interim/supporting objectives should enable completion of the Terminal Performance Objective).
- Identify FLETC/Guest Instructor/Facilitator resources (who, where from?).
- Identify Hardware/Software resources to be used.
- Develop sequence of presentation of courses/lessons.
- Identify post-conference activities and timelines prior to pilot test.

Attachment “C”

GITI Report

GENERIC INTRODUCTORY DRUG INTELLIGENCE COURSE OUTLINE

INTRODUCTION:

This course outline has been developed based on participation by representatives of several law enforcement and intelligence agencies, private sector entities, and international participants. The outline has drawn upon existing course material, the vast majority of which is in the public domain.

As part of the General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan, the Justice Training Center of the Drug Enforcement Administration has been tasked with developing a generic drug intelligence course that can be exported to Federal, State, and Local agencies to serve as the standardized core of instruction. These agencies will certainly choose to add to the curriculum with advanced courses of their own design, possibly developed in concert with the Justice Training Center.

This course outline is offered to the Justice Training Center as a "strawman" concept, to be brought forward in the inter-agency arena to be approved as the generic course required under the GCIP. The representatives who participated in drafting this outline have agreed to work further on those parts of the outline that need to be fleshed out.

ASSUMPTIONS:

This course was designed assuming that it will be a basic, introductory course intended to consume, at most, a few weeks.

- The course is modular, and can be, to some degree broken down into shorter blocks of instruction. The entire course, with all the topics in the order presented in the course, is recommended as an appropriate and complete set of issues.
- Depending on local agency administrative needs, and the organization of follow-on courses, the recommended instruction can be modified.
- The instruction can be delivered either on-site, through a resident program, or through distance learning.
- The course is aimed at entry-level students, especially State and Locals. The course would lend itself for inclusion in other introductory courses, possibly as a Drug Intelligence block of instruction in a much larger course on criminal intelligence.
- The course would lead to more advanced courses either at the local agency, or at a central provider - such as the Justice Training Center.
- The course will be offered, initially, in the training environment for law enforcement intelligence or related professionals.
- It can be integrated at some other time into an educational program to be presented at the undergraduate level, leading to graduate level instruction at appropriate colleges or universities.
- No attempt is made here to deal with resource issues, personnel, and technology.

MODULES:

The following modules are recommended presented here in outline form. The next step, beyond this outline, will be to develop actual course content - or adapt existing instructional material. Representatives of agencies participating in this outline have agreed to take on this challenge.

I.A. BACKGROUND AND PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLIGENCE

Building from the general, and narrowing to the specific customer, this block will present the structure, function, services, and basic products of intelligence. The most important definitions of terms will be laid out, noting that they will be expanded upon in later blocks of instruction.

The organizational history of intelligence, the mission of the intelligence professional, and the culture of intelligence work will be introduced. The goal will be to identify the student's place as an analyst in intelligence work.

This block could be similar to the Intelligence Analysis Practice block on introduction to intelligence or to the NCIS block on background. The RIAP staff at Mercyhurst College will contribute to this block.

I.B. THINKING ABOUT INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

This block will introduce concepts of cognitive skills, creative thinking, and methodology appropriate to intelligence analysis.

This block will be developed by David Moore and Lisa Krizan at the Center for the Art and Science of Intelligence, DoD.

II. THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS/INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

This block will present the intelligence cycle as an ideal, from which individual agencies will depart. It will be built around the basic concepts of planning, collecting, analyzing, and presenting intelligence. The block will introduce the role, function, and responsibilities of the analyst in each stage of the cycle.

This block would be similar to the Intelligence Analysis Practice block on the Intelligence Analyst. Frank Marsh at NDIC has agreed to develop this block.

III. METHODS AND SKILLS

This block will present the methods and skills in an analyst's toolbox, built around the stages in the intelligence cycle introduced in the previous block.

III.A. Planning Developed by Moore and Krizan.
III.B. Collection Developed by PJAP and Tom Copeland Lexis-Nexis
III.C. Analysis Developed by Jill Webb JTC and Danny Taylor NWCCC

III.D. Presentation Developed by Frank Marsh at NDIC

III.A. PLANNING

This block will present the concept of direction and self-direction of an analytic project. It will include discussion of being tasked, clarifying tasking and the analyst's responsibility to become proactive in intelligence work.

Problem definition and redefinition will be explained, and tied to a later block of instruction on testing hypotheses as part of intelligence analysis.

Concepts of project management, clarification of requirements, timeliness, completeness and responding to critical needs will be reinforced.

This block will emphasize the necessity of planning in ensuring success.

III.B. COLLECTION

This block will present key concepts relating to intelligence collection, beginning with general definitions and leading into agency specific concepts which will have to be followed up in more advanced courses.

The legislation dealing with collection and regulations bearing on the agency will be presented.

How to prepare a collection plan, with feedback from the evaluation process, will be presented. There will be discussion of how to construct indicators and assemble them into a workable plan.

Source management, handling and protection, in particular regarding human sources, will be stressed.

Additional concepts, including problem assessment, exploitation of sources, and the role of the analyst will be explored.

The various sources of information will be introduced, to the extent possible in an introductory course: Open Source, business proprietary, classified.

One sample typology of sources, depending on the agency being trained, could be IMINT, SIGINT, MASINT, HUMINT, OSINT for strategic level agencies. Another typology could include, for tactical agencies, wire surveillance, forensics, witness statements.

III.C. ANALYSIS

This block will deal with the analytical process per se. It will be prepared in separate levels, Strategic, Operational, and Tactical. The strategic level would best be fully presented in a follow-on course. Definitions will be clarified.

i). Logical reasoning methods will be presented, using "pencil and paper" exercises using, wherever possible, real world examples and cases keyed to the agency. This instruction will include hypothesis formation and reformation, competing

hypotheses, probability methods, statistical analysis, and other approaches to correlation, evaluation, and interpretation of intelligence information.

ii). Methods of organizing data will be presented, wherever possible using the appropriate technical applications to include: network analysis, charting and diagrams, profiling, flow-charting. Depending on the specificity required by the agency, toll analysis, particular financial analysis tools, and more advanced means of organizing data can be presented. At this point, the possible need for feedback to the collection process will be discussed.

iii). The "so what" of intelligence analysis will be presented with instruction on drawing conclusions, defending an analytic position, estimates, making analytic judgements, forecasting, and the appropriateness of "going out on a limb."

III.D. PRESENTATION

This block will be highlighted as the essential step that makes intelligence complete. Successful presentation depends on doing a good job at the planning stage, ensuring tasking is understood, and demonstrating initiative. The goal would be an effective presentation of an intelligence product responsive to customer needs.

This section would be built around generic products - a briefing, a report, an executive summary - but could be keyed to the agency's specific products.

i). ORAL - Beginning with the principles of effective oral communication, this block would present the oral executive briefing, analyst-to-analyst briefing, court testimony, or other types.

ii). WRITTEN - Beginning with effective writing methods, this block would present how to write particular products: executive summary, key judgements, and intelligence reports.

iii). GRAPHIC - This block would include the PowerPoint presentation, or other graphics package as appropriate to the agency, and principles of effective graphic presentation of data.

SUMMING UP

After presenting the intelligence process, and stepping through the analyst's role from planning through collection, the course would sum up with discussion of evaluation of intelligence, and how evaluation is best used to correct earlier steps in the process. Finally, the purpose of each block of instruction will be recapped to ensure the student can take away lessons from each block in a way they can be applied immediately on the job.

Attachment “D”

GCIP Initiative

General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan

February 2000

GENERAL COUNTERDRUG INTELLIGENCE PLAN
(GCIP)

President's Transmittal Letter to the People of the United States

Cabinet Principals' Transmittal Letter to the President

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Executive Summary

The General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) addresses issues identified by the White House Task Force *Review of the U.S. Counterdrug Intelligence Centers and Activities*. The Review was commissioned in September 1997 by the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of National Drug Control Policy, and was supported by the Secretaries of Defense, Transportation, and State. The Review was mandated in the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act of 1998 and the 1998 Intelligence Authorization Act.

The GCIP reflects the collective need to clarify and make systemic improvements to U.S. drug intelligence and information programs. Its goal is to establish a drug intelligence framework that supports operators in the field, improves Federal, state, and local relationships, and responds to policymaker needs as they formulate counterdrug policy, taskings, and resource decisions.

The GCIP provides a means for the law enforcement and intelligence communities to resolve drug intelligence issues and to aid National Drug Control Program agencies in satisfying performance measures of effectiveness. When implemented, the GCIP will facilitate the appropriate and timely exchange of information between the intelligence and drug law enforcement communities, taking care to respect law and regulation, but will not change agency authorities or the laws governing interagency relationships.

The following summarizes the 73 GCIP action items. To the extent that these action items delineated in the GCIP have resource implications, they must be weighed against other priorities. Therefore, the action items with resource implications for future years will need to be vetted through the normal budget process. Participating agencies will need to identify funding options to accommodate the Plan's objectives.

National Counterdrug Intelligence Coordination: Two collaborative coordinating structures, the Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating Group (CDICG) and its supporting staff, the Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat (CDX), are created. The CDICG is composed of 13 representatives from Cabinet elements and law enforcement agencies with drug intelligence responsibilities, is co-chaired by law enforcement and intelligence officials, and receives policy guidance from the President's Council on Counter-Narcotics, as well as from the *National Drug Control Strategy*. The CDX will be led by a senior law enforcement officer, will have a senior intelligence officer as its deputy, and will have a full-time staff of experts detailed from participating departments and agencies.

National Centers: The existing program priorities and mission statements for three of the four national centers with counterdrug intelligence missions require further definition to improve coordination and eliminate unnecessary duplication. Action items are presented to make the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), the El Paso Intelligence

Center (EPIC), and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) more effective in their missions.

- The DCI Crime and Narcotics Center will remain the principal center for *foreign strategic* counterdrug analysis and for coordinating Intelligence Community support to U.S. foreign counterdrug activities;

- NDIC will become the principal center for *domestic strategic* counterdrug analysis in support of policymakers and resource planners;

- EPIC will be strengthened as the principal center for *operational and investigative* intelligence analysis of illicit drug movements in support of interdiction activities and U.S. law enforcement; and,

- FinCEN will be strengthened as the principal center for *strategic* analysis of narcotics-related *financial* crimes and for *investigative* support to law enforcement concerning financial crimes.

Regional, State, and Local Cooperation: The GCIP promotes Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement information sharing. It also leverages successes such as Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) task forces, U.S. Attorneys' Offices, Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs), High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs), the High-Risk Money-Laundering and Related Financial Crimes Areas (HIFCAs), and the Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) to maximize interagency cooperation. Specific proposals include a call for Federal law enforcement agencies and HIDTAs in major metropolitan areas to bring counterdrug intelligence analysts together into collocated, consolidated intelligence centers; to enhance interagency enforcement and information sharing; to streamline production of area drug threat assessments; to consolidate drug seizure data; and, to better exploit seized documents.

Foreign Coordination: The GCIP promotes a more robust international counterdrug effort within U.S. Missions and between the United States and its counterdrug partners. Included are proposals to improve leadership and coordination of counterdrug components in U.S. Missions; improve counterdrug intelligence dissemination to host nations; ensure adequate levels of U.S. Customs Service personnel overseas to enhance intelligence on foreign commercial drug smuggling activities; ensure adequate numbers of drug law enforcement analytic personnel overseas; increase attention to foreign drug-related illicit finances; and, clarify legal and policy guidelines on law enforcement and intelligence coordination.

Analytic Personnel Development and Training: Specific measures will standardize professional career development paths for Federal law enforcement intelligence analysts and enhance the broader dissemination of sanitized intelligence from law enforcement investigative reporting. In addition, actions are presented to standardize and improve drug intelligence training and education.

Information Technology: An effective drug intelligence system requires a firm information technology foundation to enable all drug intelligence analysts with the appropriate clearances to readily obtain the information they need to do their jobs. Accomplishing this requires: formation of an interagency group to guide and coordinate automation upgrades and connectivity policies and initiatives; completion of a detailed schedule for implementing specific architectural upgrades; and, improvement of the technical capabilities and interactions among NDIC, EPIC, FinCEN, and law enforcement at all levels.

Summary

The *Review of the U.S. Counterdrug Intelligence Centers and Activities* (the Review) was commissioned in September 1997 by the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of National Drug Control Policy (hereafter termed Director of ONDCP) and supported by the Secretaries of Defense, Transportation, and State. The Review responded to the requirement for a study of the national counterdrug intelligence architecture that was mandated in the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act of 1998, and a review of the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) that was mandated in the 1998 Intelligence Authorization Act. The field review was conducted over a seven-month period by the White House Task Force (WHTF), which comprised detailees from the Department of Justice, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), ONDCP, and the Departments of Defense, Transportation, Treasury, and State. Issues identified in the WHTF Report were resolved by representatives of the Cabinet Principals meeting as the Senior Working Group (SWG) and later as the Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating Group (CDICG). This General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) is the culmination of deliberations by the SWG, the CDICG, and the Cabinet Principals to address issues identified in the Review.

Review Findings

The WHTF found that there is no single, all-encompassing national counterdrug intelligence architecture.[1] Instead, there are two loosely associated systems, one each for the intelligence and law enforcement communities. The Intelligence Community has a centralized intelligence-sharing system and interagency information-sharing structure; the law enforcement community does not. Within the law enforcement community, each agency has developed its own information-sharing and communication systems that serve agency-specific needs. Terminology, practices, techniques, and expectations vary widely within the law enforcement agencies and between the law enforcement and intelligence communities.

Counterdrug investigative information and intelligence sharing—both among law enforcement agencies and between law enforcement and Intelligence Community components—has improved significantly over the past several years. There are numerous exemplary interagency programs, joint operational and analytic endeavors, and

[1] Intelligence, as used in this document, is a generic term referring to information related to subjects of interest to a government agency. When used to refer to either Intelligence Community or law enforcement community intelligence, the context in which it is used is critical to its intended meaning, as each community uses the same word to mean different things, often resulting in communications problems. Intelligence Community "intelligence" is information resulting specifically from Intelligence Community collection actions and relating to the capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign powers, organizations, or persons (Executive Order 12333). Law enforcement "intelligence," also referred to as investigative information, is sensitive information that is part of a law enforcement inquiry, matter, or case, usually developed as a byproduct of law enforcement investigative and interdiction efforts and subject to being divulged, as required, to support the arrest and prosecution of the subject(s) of the investigation.

critical data-sharing mechanisms in place that would have seemed unattainable to most practitioners a decade ago. However, the Review found that while there were laudable achievements, boundaries among various law enforcement and intelligence components are largely bridged by carefully crafted legal interpretations and a mixture of ad hoc interpersonal relationships and informal mechanisms.

This informal environment continues to result in gaps in analytic coverage, as well as incomplete and inaccurate analysis and unnecessary duplication, single-agency perceptions of critical drug threats or issues, and occasional mistrust and confusion in the counterdrug community. At the operational level, some investigators and inspectors still complain of a shortage of actionable intelligence; they believe that they receive insufficient guidance and intelligence support from the national level. The WHTF noted the common complaint was that no one has the charter to define the "lanes of authority" for the different components and to monitor the components' adherence to them.

Improving the Counterdrug Intelligence Architecture

This General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP, or the Plan) reflects the collective agreement of the Director of ONDCP, the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Transportation, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs on the need to clarify and make systemic changes to U.S. drug intelligence and information programs. The goal is to establish a drug intelligence framework that both supports operators in the field and responds to the needs of policymakers as they formulate counterdrug policy, generate tasking and requirements, and make resource decisions.

The Director of ONDCP, acting on behalf of the President, continues to play the lead role for the U.S. Government in formulating drug control policy and developing the *National Drug Control Strategy*. The Director of ONDCP is responsible for providing oversight and policy guidance to the respective departments and agencies that make up the Federal counterdrug community. Under the new drug intelligence architecture, the Director of ONDCP, as Executive Director of the President's Council on Counter-Narcotics (PCCN), will monitor progress in the implementation of the GCIP and promote resolution of drug intelligence policy issues.

The GCIP, in turn, provides a means for the law enforcement community and the Intelligence Community, responsive to the national drug policy prescribed by the Director of ONDCP, to resolve drug intelligence issues and to aid National Drug Control Program agencies in satisfying performance measures of effectiveness. The GCIP will also strengthen the overall process to provide operators and investigators with timely, relevant, and actionable drug-related information and intelligence necessary to disrupt and dismantle illicit drug-trafficking infrastructures, organizations, and resources. It will do these things by creating and implementing effective interfaces between domestic and

intelligence- and information-gathering organizations, as well as between the law enforcement community and Intelligence Community agencies, consistent with law.

To fashion the vision for a more integrated, strategically-oriented counterdrug intelligence architecture, the GCIP outlines a series of action items grouped into discrete sections under six general topic areas:

- National Counterdrug Intelligence Coordination
- National Centers
- Regional, State, and Local Cooperation
- Foreign Coordination
- Analytic Personnel Development and Training
- Information Technology

National Counterdrug Intelligence Coordination

The central theme confronted in the WHTF Review was the need for clear, consistent inter-community and interagency coordination of the counterdrug intelligence effort. A concern most often echoed was, "No one is in charge." The Review established that it was neither possible nor appropriate for any one person or component to be "in charge" in a monolithic coordinating body. The law enforcement and intelligence communities each have very distinct and legitimate legal and operational authorities that must be preserved in the joint management of counterdrug investigative and intelligence activities.

What is possible and appropriate, however, is the establishment of a strengthened interagency coordinating mechanism that fosters and facilitates both greater information sharing and operational coordination between the law enforcement and intelligence counterdrug communities. This mechanism recognizes and optimizes the capabilities, equities, and authorities of all Federal departments and agencies engaged in the counterdrug effort, and also strengthens the important counterdrug partnership among the Federal, state, and local law enforcement communities.

The structure defined in this section of the GCIP forms the core of a new, three-tiered mechanism designed to specifically meet the coordination need. The centerpiece of this new collaborative coordinating structure is the Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating Group (CDICG), with its supporting staff, the Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat (CDX). The CDICG will draw its policy guidance and input from the members of the President's Council on Counter-Narcotics (PCCN), as well as from the five goals and objectives of the *National Drug Control Strategy*. The CDICG derives its ability to resolve issues through the authorities and prerogatives of its respective members.

- The PCCN shall have a Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Committee comprising eight members: the Attorney General, the Director of ONDCP, the Director of

Central Intelligence, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of State, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

- The CDICG comprises 13 representatives of the Cabinet members and agency heads. The CDICG will provide a semiannual report of all cross-jurisdictional counterdrug intelligence issues addressed and recommendations made (including progress on all of the action items in this GCIP) to the PCCN.
- The CDX will be a full-time staff of experienced counterdrug intelligence specialists detailed from all of the participating departments and core agencies in this Plan. Its director will be a senior law enforcement officer; its deputy director will be a senior Intelligence Community officer.

National Centers

One of the key charges by Congress for this Plan was the articulation of clear roles and mission statements for the core components that comprise the interagency counterdrug intelligence architecture. The review process validated the existing program priorities and mission statements for all but three of these components: the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN).

The respective missions and roles of these three centers have been the source of much of the confusion and uncertainty surrounding the current counterdrug intelligence system. It is imperative that their respective missions, and that of the DCI Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC), be complementary and comprehensive, rather than duplicative or competitive. One intent of this GCIP is to clarify program priorities and mission statements and strengthen each of these centers individually, while collectively promoting a more integrated and coordinated intelligence support architecture for both domestic and foreign counterdrug strategic planning and operational support.

Under the 18 action items advanced in this section of the Plan, the drug intelligence responsibilities of these four primary national-level centers are further defined to improve coordination and eliminate unnecessary duplication.

- CNC will remain the principal center for *foreign strategic* counterdrug analysis and for coordinating Intelligence Community support to U.S. foreign counterdrug activities;

- NDIC will become the principal center for *domestic strategic* counterdrug analysis in support of policymakers and resource planners;

- EPIC will be strengthened as the principal center for *operational* and *investigative* intelligence analysis of illicit drug movements in support of interdiction activities and U.S. law enforcement; and,

- FinCEN will be strengthened as the principal center for *strategic* analysis of narcotics-related *financial* crimes and for *investigative* support to law enforcement concerning financial crimes.[2]

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Regional, State, and Local Cooperation

The overall success of national enforcement efforts to combat the availability and use of illegal drugs in the United States depends in great measure on the effectiveness of state and local law enforcement efforts. Federal drug law enforcement agencies rely heavily on the input and participation of these state and local organizations in task forces and multiagency investigations. The challenge is to leverage resources and existing mechanisms such as Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) task forces, U.S. Attorneys' Offices, Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs), High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs), and the Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) to maximize interagency cooperation at all levels. This will also include the High-Risk Money-Laundering and Related Financial Crimes Areas (HIFCAs) as integral parts of the National Money Laundering Strategy.

Some 17,000 Federal, regional, state, local, and tribal law enforcement and support entities exist. Often agencies operate autonomously, frequently with overlapping jurisdictions, and are supported by multiple authorities, procedures, and systems. Drug investigators increasingly have joined together in local or regional task force programs for coordination and support. Multicomponent task forces and HIDTAs, in particular, have multiplied. While all serve to advance local or regional cooperation, they are insufficiently coordinated on a larger scale. This often fosters jurisdictional and funding competitiveness.

The regional or local intelligence centers associated with many of these multiagency programs are intended to be strongly tactical, augmenting the development of individual cases. However, they do not routinely generate meaningful systematic trend and pattern analyses or further interregional information exchange. A typical, large U.S. metropolitan area has the DEA, FBI, Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), U.S. Customs Service, state, county, and city police forces, and Federal, state, city, and county prosecutors carrying out drug investigations, interdictions, and prosecutions in support of their respective missions and jurisdictions. Many have their own intelligence capabilities and many participate in joint task forces. Information is shared among agencies predominately through interpersonal communication on a case-by-case basis. Accommodating the complexity of U.S. law enforcement, in terms of the number of agencies and agent-level information-sharing practices, is a central challenge of a common counterdrug intelligence-sharing system.

This section of the GCIP presents 13 action items to further enhance regional, state, and local cooperative efforts. Specific proposals include a call for major metropolitan areas

[2]The terms strategic, investigative, and operational intelligence are defined in Appendix D-Glossary of Terms.

to bring appropriate counterdrug intelligence analysts from DEA, FBI, HIDTAs, and other components together into collocated intelligence centers, with a common set of core functions and capabilities, in support of all counterdrug law enforcement within their areas; to enhance interagency enforcement and information-sharing efforts; and, to streamline several processes locally, such as area drug threat assessments, drug seizure reporting, and seized document exploitation.

Foreign Coordination

This section of the Plan addresses the international dimension of the counterdrug intelligence architecture. The 12 action items in this section further enhance the already strong relationships among U.S. counterdrug components operating overseas. They will promote a more robust counterdrug effort between the United States and its many allies in the international counterdrug community. These action items include specific proposals for improving leadership and coordination of counterdrug components of U.S. Missions abroad; improving counterdrug intelligence dissemination to host nations; enhancing intelligence on foreign commercial drug smuggling activities, including the placement of U.S. Customs Service drug intelligence personnel overseas; ensuring adequate drug law enforcement analytic personnel overseas; increasing attention to foreign drug-related illicit finances; and, clarifying legal and policy guidelines on law enforcement and intelligence coordination.

Analytic Personnel Development and Training

This section of the GCIP brings necessary attention to analytic personnel development and training. The action items delineated in this section will strengthen the drug law enforcement community's intelligence structure through adequate staffing, while concurrently enhancing the abilities of law enforcement intelligence analysts and other law enforcement personnel. Overall, Federal components need to build upon their current drug intelligence efforts, especially in areas of analysis, recruitment, training, technology, support, and information sharing. At the same time, a clearer understanding of the legitimate differences among philosophies and policies of law enforcement and Intelligence Community agencies will enable them to perform as a true community and deliver fully coordinated drug intelligence. The analyst function within law enforcement agencies—designed primarily to support ongoing investigations and prosecutions—will be more clearly defined, with a structured career path.

The 20 action items in this section include measures to ensure an adequate number of Federal law enforcement drug intelligence analysts; to establish and standardize across agencies professional development career paths for Federal law enforcement intelligence analysts; to enhance the broader dissemination of sanitized intelligence from law enforcement investigative reporting; and, to better coordinate counterdrug intelligence training and education conducted under the various departmental training programs and facilities, including:

(1) The Justice Training Center in Quantico, Virginia, within which DOJ is considering establishing a national crime and drug intelligence academy.
(2) The Treasury Department's Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, in Glynco, Georgia.
(3) The Defense Department's Joint Military Intelligence Training Center.
(4) The HIDTA Assistance Center.
(5) The Intelligence Community-chaired interagency Training for Intelligence and Law Enforcement program.

Information Technology

Drug intelligence analysts must be supported by effective, secure, and powerful information systems. The drug intelligence centers and activities require an architecture that permits rapid access by authorized analysts to all relevant information sources; quick information retrieval and sorting; secure information transfer among organizations; and tools to manipulate and analyze the information. The existing array of information technology and communications systems, particularly in the law enforcement community, needs significant improvement in secure interconnectivity to adequately support drug intelligence dissemination and information sharing.

The state of information systems architectures today is much improved over that of August 1992, when the *National Drug Control Information Resource Management Plan* was published under ONDCP auspices. The Intelligence Community has achieved significant advancements that address many of the requirements for interagency information sharing in the national security realm. The law enforcement community has also completed numerous improvements in overall automation across the Federal, state, and local levels. There are also several positive information-handling and -sharing initiatives involving law enforcement, the Intelligence Community, military components, and regional organizations.

Despite these successes, drug intelligence and law enforcement organizations' systems remain virtual "stovepipes." The counterdrug community can maximize the efficiency of the intelligence process by adopting a systems architecture that places the relevant information into a series of interoperable and accessible information spaces, with respect for need-to-know and proper authorization. The creation of shared information spaces will make community-wide electronic access a reality, providing analysts the flexibility to interact with and gather information from other organizations. It will also provide the technical foundation for the proactive and secure dissemination of intelligence to appropriate customers.

The architecture outlined in this Plan will provide a mechanism for appropriate state and local personnel to interact electronically with one another and their Federal counterparts in a secure environment. The goal is to enable all of the drug intelligence analysts with the appropriate credentials to obtain all of the information they need to do their jobs. There is no intent to enable, nor will the system permit, personnel without appropriate

need-to-know and security clearances to access national security databases, or Intelligence Community analysts to directly access domestic criminal investigative data.

Advances in communications technology have removed most of the technical barriers to information sharing, while also improving methods of protecting information. Technical security measures such as encryption, smart cards, public-private key infrastructures, Internet protocol security standards, biometrics, and firewalls can be used to prevent unauthorized access, allowing network administrators and security professionals to enforce the standards of need-to-know and to ensure that the proper authorizations are in effect. The technical means exist for the drug intelligence community to share information securely, but the connecting hardware and software must be widely available throughout participating agencies. Departmental and agency procedures will be reviewed and revised to ensure they maximize secure information sharing.

This Plan envisions a future systems architecture that is both secure enough to support information sharing and also easily accessible from across the counterdrug intelligence and law enforcement communities. The goal is to ensure that all drug intelligence and law enforcement personnel can obtain expeditiously the information they need. The Plan promotes the use of existing networks and secure Web technology to connect the drug intelligence community. The technical components include more robust, timely, and accurate input to agency databases; adherence to strict security with audit trails; proactive dissemination of non-case-specific law enforcement information to the broader drug intelligence community; single-workstation access to multiple sources of law enforcement information; and, adequate technical support, life-cycle enhancements, training, user support, and analytic tools.

This section provides 10 specific action items that will create the basis for an effective drug intelligence systems architecture. Included are the formation of an interagency Systems Policy Review Group (SPRG) to help guide and coordinate component automation upgrades and connectivity policies and initiatives; plans for the completion within one year of a detailed schedule for implementing specific architectural upgrades; and specific measures to improve the technical capabilities and interactions among the core national level centers with drug intelligence responsibilities (NDIC, EPIC, and FinCEN), and the HIDTA Intelligence Centers.

Recognition of Statutory and Component Authorities

The missions and functions of the agencies of the Intelligence Community and the U.S. law enforcement agencies and their enabling legal authorities differ substantially. This Plan recognizes that agencies of the Intelligence Community are obligated to protect sensitive intelligence sources and methods from improper disclosure. Likewise, drug law enforcement agencies are obligated to protect sensitive, undercover, and legally restricted law enforcement sources, information, individuals, and techniques.

The GCIP does not change fundamental agency authorities or the laws governing interagency relationships. The agenda set forth in this Plan facilitates the appropriate and timely exchange of information between the intelligence and drug law enforcement communities, taking care to respect law and regulation. The Plan recognizes and respects the legal authorities that govern: the collection and dissemination of information pertaining to "U.S. persons;" the dissemination of certain legally-restricted law enforcement information, such as taxpayer information, grand jury information, and information derived from court authorized electronic surveillance; information disclosure pursuant to the Privacy Act, as amended; and, information sharing that, if not properly conducted, could "taint" domestic drug investigations and prosecutions with information derived from sensitive intelligence sources and methods, resulting in the dilemma of either dismissing the prosecution or compromising a sensitive source or method.

The functions and responsibilities of the counterdrug intelligence centers and coordinating bodies addressed in this Plan do not supersede or modify the authorities of Executive Department or Agency heads, nor confer statutory roles and responsibilities upon them. The Plan recognizes the legitimate need of individual agencies to retain their intelligence components.

To the extent that this Plan addresses authorities or functions of the DCI, including the authority to establish requirements and priorities to govern the collection of national intelligence by elements of the Intelligence Community; the authority to approve collection requirements, determine collection priorities, and resolve conflicts in collection priorities levied on national collection assets, except as otherwise agreed with the Secretary of Defense pursuant to direction of the President; the responsibility for providing national intelligence; and the functions of the DCI Crime and Narcotics Center, it is expository of already existing authorities and functions. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to imply any grant of or change to the missions, functions, or authorities of the DCI.

Resource Implications

To the extent that these 73 action items delineated in the GCIP have resource implications, they must be weighed against other priorities. Currently, FY2000 departmental and agency resources are not programmed to accommodate such action items. Therefore, the action items with resource implications for future years will need to be vetted through the normal budget process. Participating agencies will need to identify funding options to accommodate the Plan’s objectives.

Introduction

The General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan[3] (GCIP) establishes an all-encompassing national counterdrug intelligence architecture. It advances an action agenda to improve information sharing and resolve issues of mission clarity, systems connectivity, interagency cooperation, and analyst professionalization. The GCIP fashions the vision for a better-integrated, more effective counterdrug intelligence architecture—building on notable successes of recent years. The GCIP is the blueprint to clarify and make systematic U.S. counterdrug intelligence and law enforcement information programs to better support the departments, agencies, centers, and activities involved in:

- Drug policy formulation and implementation;
- Federal, state, and local law enforcement drug investigations and prosecutions;
- Foreign and domestic drug interdiction; and,
- International drug control programs.

The GCIP is a collaborative interagency product. It builds on the findings of the White House Task Force (WHTF) *Review of the U.S. Counterdrug Intelligence Centers and Activities*. The GCIP establishes ways to provide policymakers, operators, and investigators with timely, relevant, and actionable drug-related intelligence and information necessary to disrupt and dismantle illicit drug trafficking infrastructures, organizations, and resources. The Plan maximizes the opportunities for timely information sharing, intelligence exchange, and operational coordination—fully within all statutory limitations—among the various policymaking, military, law enforcement, and Intelligence Community components that collectively make up the national counterdrug intelligence architecture. The action items leverage the important progress made on these fronts, and provide a framework that promotes additional and improved counterdrug intelligence coordination and information flow at the Federal, state, and local levels.

Authority

The GCIP was developed in response to the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act of 1998, which required the Director of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) to:

> "…submit to the appropriate congressional committees…a plan to improve coordination, and eliminate unnecessary duplication, among the counterdrug intelligence centers and counterdrug activities of the Federal Government…"

[3]Appendix A describes the process to produce the Plan.

The Plan also responds to the 1998 Intelligence Authorization Act, which required a review of the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) mission.[4]

Relationship to the National Drug Control Strategy

The goals and objectives of the *National Drug Control Strategy* guide the GCIP. Counterdrug intelligence supports individual organizations' drug monitoring, and law enforcement, intelligence, and other counterdrug missions under the *National Drug Control Strategy*. The Strategy has five goals to reduce illegal drug use and its consequences:

Goal 1: Educate and enable America's youth to reject illegal drugs as well as alcohol and tobacco.

Goal 2: Increase the safety of America's citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence.

Goal 3: Reduce health and social costs to the public of illegal drug use.

Goal 4: Shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat.

Goal 5: Break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply.

GCIP Recognition of Statutory and Component Authorities

Counterdrug intelligence organizations employ a variety of techniques to collect intelligence. Existing Federal statutes and executive orders authorize U.S. counterdrug intelligence organizations to collect information regarding suspected illegal drug activities of both U.S. and foreign persons and organizations both within and outside the United States. Generally, law enforcement organizations such as the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) collect both domestic and foreign drug information, whereas national intelligence organizations such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) are authorized to collect only foreign intelligence on any drug-related activity outside the United States. In general, Executive Order 12333 (United States Intelligence Activities) limits agencies such as the CIA, NSA, and DIA from collecting, retaining, and disseminating information concerning the activities of U.S. persons.

The missions and functions of the agencies of the Intelligence Community and the U.S. law enforcement agencies and their enabling legal authorities differ substantially. This Plan recognizes that agencies of the Intelligence Community are obligated to protect sensitive intelligence sources and methods from improper disclosure. Likewise, drug law enforcement agencies are obligated to protect sensitive, undercover, and legally restricted law enforcement sources, information, individuals, and techniques.

[4]Appendix B cites the relevant portions of the aforementioned Acts, and Appendix C contains the mission statements for each of the national-level centers with counterdrug responsibilities and activities.

This Plan does not change agency authorities or the laws governing interagency relationships. The action agenda set forth in this Plan facilitates the appropriate and timely exchange of information between the intelligence and drug law enforcement communities, taking care to respect law and regulation. The actions recognize and respect the legal authorities that govern: the collection and dissemination of information pertaining to “U.S. persons;” the dissemination of certain legally-restricted law enforcement information, such as taxpayer information, grand jury information, and information derived from court-authorized electronic surveillance; and information sharing that, if not properly conducted, could "taint" domestic drug investigations and prosecutions with information derived from sensitive foreign intelligence sources and methods, causing the dilemma of either dismissing the prosecution or compromising a sensitive source or method.

The functions and responsibilities of the counterdrug intelligence centers and their activities and coordinating bodies addressed in this Plan do not supersede or modify the responsibilities or authorities of, nor confer statutory roles on, heads of Executive Departments or Agencies.

Nothing contained in this Plan shall be construed to imply any grant of or change to the missions, functions, or authorities of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). To the extent that this Plan addresses authorities or functions of the DCI, including the authority to establish requirements and priorities to govern the collection of national intelligence by elements of the Intelligence Community; the authority to approve collection requirements, determine collection priorities, and resolve conflicts in collection priorities levied on national collection assets, except as otherwise agreed with the Secretary of Defense pursuant to direction of the President; the responsibility for providing national intelligence; and the functions of the DCI Crime and Narcotics Center, it is expository of already existing authorities and functions.

Resource Implications

To the extent that these 73 action items delineated in the GCIP have resource implications, they must be weighed against other priorities. Currently, FY2000 departmental and agency resources are not programmed to accommodate such action items. Therefore, the action items with resource implications for future years will need to be vetted through the normal budget process. Participating agencies will need to identify funding options to accommodate the Plan’s objectives.

Section A:
National Counterdrug Intelligence Coordination

Introduction

The central theme confronted in the White House Task Force (WHTF) Review was the need for clear, consistent intercommunity and interagency coordination of the counterdrug intelligence effort. A concern most often echoed was, "No one is in charge." The Review established that it was neither possible nor appropriate for any one person or component to be "in charge" in a monolithic coordinating body. The law enforcement and intelligence communities each have very distinct and legitimate legal and operational authorities that must be preserved in the joint management of counterdrug investigative and intelligence activities.

What is possible and appropriate, however, is the establishment of a strengthened inter-component coordinating mechanism that fosters and facilitates both greater information sharing and operational coordination between the law enforcement and intelligence counterdrug communities. This mechanism recognizes and optimizes the capabilities, equities, and authorities of all Federal departments engaged in this effort, and also strengthens the important counterdrug partnership among the Federal, state, and local law enforcement communities.

The coordinating structure defined below forms the core of a three-tiered coordination mechanism designed to specifically meet the above objectives. The centerpiece of this collaborative coordinating structure is the new Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating Group (CDICG**),** with its supporting staff, the Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat (CDX). The CDICG will draw its policy guidance from the President's Council on Counter-Narcotics and from the five goals and supporting objectives of the *National Drug Control Strategy* and derives its ability to resolve issues through the authorities and prerogatives of its respective members from the law enforcement and intelligence communities.

National Counterdrug Intelligence Coordination

I. PURPOSE. The coordinating structure for carrying out the functions and for implementing the recommendations contained in this General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) is set forth below. This structure is intended to maximize timely information sharing, intelligence exchange, and operational coordination—fully within statutory limitations—among the policymaking, military, law enforcement, and Intelligence Community components that collectively make up our national counterdrug intelligence architecture. The new architecture will build on the important progress that has been made over the past decade, and provide a framework that promotes even further

counterdrug intelligence coordination and information flow, at the Federal, state, and local levels, in the 21st Century.

II. THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COUNTER-NARCOTICS.

The Council, originally established by Executive Order, was given statutory authorization under section 709 of the Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 1998 (21 U.S.C. 1708). With the Director of ONDCP serving as Executive Director, this cabinet-level Council advises and assists the President in providing direction and oversight for the *National Drug Control Strategy*, and in ensuring coordination among departments and agencies of the Federal Government concerning implementation of the *National Drug Control Strategy*. Consistent with those responsibilities, the Council shall serve as the preeminent body for providing oversight on all issues relating to drug intelligence policy. There is established within the Council an eight-member body (the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of ONDCP, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of State, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs) known as the Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Committee, whose purpose is to provide a focal point for all counterdrug intelligence policy issues within the PCCN. Other PCCN members may attend meetings of this Executive Committee as appropriate to the issues under consideration. Through existing counternarcotics fora noted in Section III, below, and subordinate bodies prescribed in Sections IV and V, below, the Council will monitor implementation of the GCIP, and, more particularly, it will oversee the development and dissemination of law enforcement and intelligence requirements to meet the goals and objectives of the *National Drug Control Strategy*.

III. COUNTERDRUG INTERAGENCY POLICY AND PROGRAM COORDINATION.

The interdepartmental bodies listed below meet to identify and coordinate counterdrug issues. Each focuses on a distinct area of the counterdrug arena, described below, and may provide input into the CDICG or CDX, as appropriate. While the Counter-Narcotics Interagency Working Group deals exclusively with policy guidance issues, the remaining entities deal primarily with operational and programmatic issues.

A. The Counter-Narcotics Interagency Working Group (CN-IWG), chaired by ONDCP, is the principal interagency, senior working-level forum for coordinating policy guidance related to counterdrug issues. As described below, it is also a principal forum for identifying counterdrug intelligence-related requirements and taskings that may cross jurisdictional lines or involve multiple components within the Federal law enforcement community and the Intelligence Community.

B. The Southern Frontiers Committee is chaired by the Attorney General and provides operational focus and direction to law enforcement organizations

regarding operations along the Southwest Border and the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico.

C. The Interdiction Committee (TIC), which is currently chaired by the Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service, provides advice to the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator (USIC) in support of his role of overseeing the adequacy and optimum use of Federal interdiction assets. Additionally, the TIC provides a forum for coordination and optimization of border interdiction and promotes seamless and effective integration of interdiction efforts in support of the National Drug Control Strategy.

D. The J-3/USIC Quarterly Counterdrug Conference, which is co-chaired by the Department of Defense Joint Staff Director for Operations and the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, promotes coordination between military counterdrug support efforts and the needs of interdiction organizations.

E. The Committee on Narcotics Intelligence Issues (CNII) is chaired by the Director, DCI Crime and Narcotics Center, and promotes counterdrug coordination within the Intelligence Community.

Whenever these or other Federal counterdrug-related interagency committees and working groups identify counterdrug intelligence-related issues, requirements, or taskings that are cross- jurisdictional,[5] such matters may be referred to the CDICG, described in Section IV, below, for attention and necessary action. Matters that cannot be resolved by the CDICG will be referred to the Council.

IV. COUNTERDRUG INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING GROUP.

A. ESTABLISHMENT. There is established under the Council an interagency group known as the Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating Group, or CDICG.

B. MEMBERSHIP.

1. COMPOSITION. The CDICG shall be composed of 13 members, of whom:

a. 1 will be designated by the DCI;
b. 1 will be designated by the Attorney General;
c. 1 will be designated by the Secretary of the Treasury;
d. 1 will be designated by the Secretary of Transportation;
e. 1 will be designated by the Director of ONDCP;
f. 1 will be designated by the Secretary of Defense;
g. 1 will be designated by the Secretary of State;

[5]As used here and elsewhere in the GCIP, the term "cross-jurisdictional" refers to counterdrug intelligence issues that affect or involve both the law enforcement community and the Intelligence Community, or, within the law enforcement community, that affect or involve more than one department, or that affect both the U.S. Government and state and/or local officials.

h. 1 will be designated by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs;
i. 1 will be designated by the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration;
j. 1 will be designated by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
k. 1 will be designated by the Commissioner of the United States Customs Service;
l. 1 will be designated by the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service; and,
m. 1 will be designated by the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard.

2. LEADERSHIP. The CDICG shall be led by co-chairs from the Intelligence Community and from the Federal law enforcement community. The Intelligence Community co-chair will be the member designated by the DCI. The law enforcement co-chair will be designated from among other members of the CDICG by mutual agreement of the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Transportation. Co-chair designations will be made in consultation with the Director of ONDCP.

3. OTHER ATTENDEES. With the concurrence of the co-chairs, individual members may invite other officials, representing the major counterdrug intelligence centers and components of the participating departments and agencies, to attend meetings or participate in CDICG deliberations as appropriate to the issues under consideration. In particular, the Deputy Director for State and Local Affairs/ONDCP may attend meetings of the CDICG to discuss counterdrug intelligence issues that concern state and local officials. With the concurrence of the co-chairs, said Deputy Director may invite no more than two state and/or local law enforcement representatives to attend appropriate CDICG deliberations.

C. FUNCTIONS. The CDICG, in support of the Council or its individual members, will, among other things:

1. Ensure coordination among departments and agencies of the Federal Government responsible for conducting intelligence programs that support the *National Drug Control Strategy*;

2. Receive policy guidance and taskings from the Council; additional issues for CDICG consideration may be received from other fora as described in Section III or may be raised by individual members of the CDICG. The CDICG will refer to the Council those issues that it cannot resolve;

3. Receive and recommend to appropriate CDICG members domestic and foreign drug intelligence taskings and requirements in support of national counterdrug policymakers;

4. Provide a forum to resolve or refer for adjudication those cross-jurisdictional counterdrug intelligence issues that cannot be resolved at a lower level;

5. Study and advocate enhancements to promote the effectiveness and efficiency of both foreign and domestic counterdrug programs and activities, including the adequacy of intelligence services;

6. Commission national and regional drug threat assessments and studies as requested by senior policymakers;

7. Promote improvements to counterdrug intelligence centers and activities to strengthen mission focus, reduce functional overlap, and promote joint analytic products;

8. Assume the functions heretofore performed by the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) Executive Advisory Board, the NDIC Intelligence Priorities Board; and the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) Advisory Board;

9. Use the Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat (CDX) (described in Section V, below) to carry out the functions of the CDICG under this section, and other taskings, as appropriate; and,

10. Submit a semiannual written report concerning drug intelligence issues and recommendations to the Council.

D. AUTHORITY. The CDICG derives its ability to resolve issues through the authorities and prerogatives of its respective members.

V. COUNTERDRUG INTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT.

A. ESTABLISHMENT. In order to improve the overall effectiveness of counterdrug intelligence, there is established a full-time interagency staff known as the Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat, or CDX, which shall operate directly under the CDICG.

B. CDX DIRECTOR AND CDX DEPUTY DIRECTOR.

1. CDX DIRECTOR. There shall be a CDX Director, who will be responsible for carrying out the functions of the CDX. The CDX Director shall be designated by mutual agreement among the Attorney General, the

Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Transportation, in consultation with the Director of ONDCP, for a renewable term of two years. The CDX Director will fill an SES position.

2. CDX DEPUTY DIRECTOR. There shall be a CDX Deputy Director, who will assist the CDX Director in carrying out the functions of the CDX. The CDX Deputy Director shall be designated by the DCI, in consultation with the Director of ONDCP, for a renewable term of two years. The CDX Deputy Director will fill an SES or SIS position.

C. CDX STAFF. The CDX staff shall be initially composed of approximately 30 personnel—selected by the CDX Director from departmental nominees—on two- to three-year details, and such additional detailees as needed to fill an executive officer, legal advisor, and other administrative support positions. Within one year, and annually thereafter, the CDICG will review CDX staffing to decide if the CDX needs a mix of detailees and permanent appropriated staff positions. The CDX staff shall be organized to address:

1. Foreign drug information and intelligence;
2. Domestic drug information and intelligence;
3. Information systems and technology; and,
4. Analyst career professionalization, education, and training.

D. FUNCTIONS. The CDX shall primarily provide staff support to the CDICG, and shall act for the CDICG, as appropriate, in monitoring the implementation of the GCIP; coordinating the implementation of multiagency, cross-jurisdictional counterdrug intelligence taskings and requirements levied by or through the CDICG; and promoting resolution of cross-jurisdictional counterdrug intelligence-related issues. In so doing, the CDX shall, among other things:

1. Promote stronger information flow, information sharing, and fusion relationships among Federal, state, and local agencies, between U.S. law enforcement agencies and the Intelligence Community, and with foreign nations or international organizations;

2. Promote development of technology standards and interoperable information systems, and monitor implementation of and report on information technology and communications plans;

3. Promote improved drug intelligence career professionalization, education, and training throughout the intelligence and law enforcement communities;

4. Receive cross-jurisdictional counterdrug intelligence issues from multiple sources, review and analyze the issues, and prepare appropriate staff studies with recommendations for resolution;

5. Promote improved mechanisms for counterdrug intelligence exchange with foreign nations and international organizations;

6. Attempt to resolve issues and disputes at the lowest practical organizational level; and,

7. Draft reports and recommendations, as appropriate, including a semiannual, written report addressing issues raised and recommendations made over the past six months, to the CDICG for review and submission to the Council.

Recommendations by the CDX shall take care to protect and preserve the safeguards between U.S. law enforcement and the Intelligence Community, shall be advisory and non-binding, and may be formally and informally disputed by the applicable departments or agencies.

E. ADMINISTRATION.

1. EVALUATIONS. The co-chairs of the CDICG shall evaluate the annual performance of the CDX Director and CDX Deputy Director. Other CDX personnel shall be evaluated within the CDX. Evaluations shall be provided to the detailing agencies.

2. COOPERATION FROM OTHER AGENCIES. The CDX will receive from each department and agency of the Executive Branch:

a. Access to the information it requires to fulfill its mission, with applicable safeguards for protection of sources and methods;[6]

b. Cooperation in carrying out the functions of the CDX; and,

c. Such assistance, information, and advice as the CDX may request, to the extent permitted by law.

3. SUPPORT AND PLACEMENT. CDX will be administratively supported by the Department of Justice, housed in Justice-owned or -leased non-headquarters space in the Washington metropolitan area, and funded by ONDCP, as prescribed below. ONDCP will, through the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), assist parent agencies in obtaining and maintaining temporary SES and SIS billets for CDX.

F. FUNDING. The CDX shall be funded as a line item through the ONDCP budget per fund availability. These funds shall be used to reimburse the Justice Department for expenses associated with CDICG and CDX operating, travel, administrative, supply, security, and support services, and those agencies that provide administrative support detailees or services. Additionally, if any funds

[6]Disputes regarding CDX access to information should be referred to the head of the department or agency concerned for resolution.

remain after reimbursing the Justice Department, these funds will be used to reimburse departments and agencies from which other detailees are assigned.

G. NOTE. The functions and responsibilities of the CDX will not derogate or supersede the statutory roles, responsibilities, or authorities of participating Executive Departments and Agencies.

Section B:
National Centers

Introduction

Under the 18 action items advanced in this section of the Plan, the drug intelligence responsibilities of these four primary national-level centers are further defined to improve coordination and eliminate unnecessary duplication.

- The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC) will remain the principal center for *foreign strategic* counterdrug analysis and for coordinating Intelligence Community support to U.S. foreign counterdrug activities;

- The National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) will become the principal center for *domestic strategic* counterdrug analysis in support of policymakers and resource planners;

- The El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) will be strengthened as the principal center for *operational* and *investigative* intelligence analysis of illicit drug movements in support of interdiction activities and U.S. law enforcement; and,

- The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) will be strengthened as the principal center for *strategic* analysis of narcotics-related *financial* crimes and for *investigative* support to law enforcement concerning financial crimes.

The DCI Crime and Narcotics Center

The DCI Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC) will maintain its present mission focus and program priorities. The counterdrug mission of CNC is to oversee the development, coordination, and implementation of all counternarcotics activities within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In close collaboration with all relevant law enforcement, policymaking, and Department of Defense (DoD) counternarcotics elements, CNC is responsible for the prioritization, responsiveness, and efficient use of counternarcotics resources throughout the Intelligence Community, and for ensuring that intelligence priorities are closely coordinated with those of U.S. law enforcement.

Through the melding of analytic, operational, and technical expertise from several agencies, CNC provides a full range of multidisciplinary, current, and long-term intelligence to support policymakers and all components of the U.S. counterdrug community. The Center's analytic program addresses all dimensions of the international narcotics problem and provides intelligence to support the development and implementation of U.S. counternarcotics policy. CNC provides actionable intelligence to support a variety of operations to disrupt and dismantle major foreign drug organizations

and to detect, monitor, and interdict drug flows. CNC also assesses drug flows to the United States and is responsible for estimating annual cultivation and production for all major coca- and opium-producing countries worldwide and for cannabis crops in selected foreign countries. The Center is also responsible for ensuring that all relevant technologies are brought to bear in supporting analytic, collection, and operational efforts throughout the counterdrug community.

B-1. Strategic Assessments: Beginning in calendar year 2000, CNC will take the lead role in the interagency production of an annual International Drug Threat Assessment, which will be designed to provide more comprehensive intelligence input to the Administration's annual designated nations counterdrug certification policy process and to the formulation of the Administration's annual *National Drug Control Strategy*. In coordination with FinCEN and other appropriate agencies, CNC will also augment its analytic efforts concerning the international aspects of narcotics-related money laundering.

The National Drug Intelligence Center

B-2. Mission: The mission statement of the National Drug Intelligence Center shall be:

- *To support national policy and law enforcement decisionmakers with timely strategic domestic drug intelligence assessments, focusing on the production, trafficking, and consumption trends and patterns of all illicit drugs inside U.S. national borders and territories.*

- *To assist the Intelligence Community in guiding and prioritizing its counterdrug effort by providing to the originating law enforcement agency, or with the permission of the originating agency to a multiagency coordinating mechanism, foreign-related investigative leads discovered in its domestic analyses.*

- *To produce an annual National Drug Threat Assessment, to produce or coordinate interagency regional drug threat assessments, and to participate in other joint counterdrug assessments involving the integration of foreign and domestic drug information.*

B-3. Subordination: NDIC will remain under the direct line authority of the Deputy Attorney General, but the NDIC Executive Advisory Board (EAB) and the Intelligence Priorities Board (IPB) will be abolished. In their place, the Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating Group (CDICG) shall provide counterdrug intelligence guidance and direction to the Director, NDIC, to ensure that the Center's taskings, activities, and products are consistent with its mission and with the needs of the national interagency counterdrug community.

B-4. Production: In support of the *National Drug Control Strategy*, NDIC will take the lead role in the interagency production of an annual National Drug Threat Assessment.

This domestic-focused assessment, and the foreign-focused assessment described in Action Item B-1, above, will be designed and produced as a coordinated, two-volume companion product as part of an annual interagency threat assessment process.

NDIC will use information from Federal, state, and local sources, as well as from nationally representative and scientifically valid health and epidemiological sources, to produce timely and relevant articles, bulletins, and research studies on drug trafficking and consumption developments and trends within domestic regions, states, and major cities. NDIC will also participate in or conduct appropriate national- and regional-level colloquia and public issue roundtables. In collaboration with CNC and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), NDIC will also participate in other joint, interagency assessments that require the integration of both foreign and domestic strategic counterdrug intelligence analyses.

B-5. Special Projects: Beyond NDIC's active and continuing participation in strategic domestic analysis—for example on cocaine and heroin trafficking trends—NDIC will maintain the capability to take on appropriate additional strategic domestic research and analysis efforts that policymakers or individual counterdrug components may request through the CDICG. This will include the following five topics, which will be maintained as ongoing projects consistent with the Center's mission:

(1) Expanded research and strategic analyses of domestic marijuana production, trafficking, and consumption trends and patterns;

(2) Expanded research and strategic analyses of the production, trafficking, and consumption of methamphetamine and other illicit synthetic drugs inside the United States;

(3) Expanded research and strategic analyses of drug-related trafficking, homicides, and other violent crimes associated with gang activity in the United States;

(4) The management of an on-line National Drug Intelligence Library for the benefit of the Federal, state, and local counterdrug intelligence and law enforcement communities, to be based on existing, commonly available networks like the Anti-Drug Network (ADNET), Intelink, Law Enforcement On-line (LEO), and the Regional Information Sharing System Network (RISSNET) systems. This Plan requires that all agencies provide their finished drug intelligence products to NDIC for inclusion in its Library; and,

(5) The provision of on-site and video distance learning-based counterdrug analysis education and training, in coordination with the Justice Training Center, to both NDIC and external component analysts, including analysts in state and local law enforcement components.

B-6. Access to and Protection of Information: The Intelligence Community will provide NDIC analysts with full access to appropriate drug-related reporting and products

to maintain expertise, and to support their analyses of domestic trafficking, including the important "seamless continuum" characteristic of foreign illegal drug organizations and activities within the United States, with priority given to coordinated intercommunity counterdrug processes.

Federal law enforcement agencies will ensure full NDIC access to all pertinent intelligence and information relating to the NDIC strategic domestic drug intelligence mission, including those specific NDIC assessment and research topics coordinated through the CDICG.[7] Initially, Federal law enforcement agencies will dedicate sufficient personnel and database terminals at NDIC facilities to provide analysts with the most current law enforcement information. Eventually, with the Global Justice Information Network advances and implementation of the reports analyst concept[8] (see Action Item C-2), NDIC analysts shall have appropriate direct access to the agencies' current law enforcement drug information. The Director of NDIC shall maintain adequate training and education and aggressive security programs to ensure a level of security commensurate with the increased access to sensitive and classified information.

B-7. Document Exploitation: Over the next two years, NDIC will redirect its domestic document exploitation (DOCEX) program, transitioning this capability to an additional six regional DOCEX teams to be established at designated High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) or other regional intelligence center locations throughout the country (see Action Item C-6). NDIC document exploitation and computer forensics specialists will help train DOCEX analysts (in coordination with the Justice Training Center) as they receive their equipment packages and are ready to take on these functions. NDIC will continue to provide priority DOCEX support services until these designated elements are capable of serving their regions. At that time, the CDICG will evaluate the NDIC role as a continuing DOCEX regional and/or nationwide surge support and training assistance provider.

The El Paso Intelligence Center

B-8. Mission: The mission statement of the El Paso Intelligence Center shall be:

To support United States law enforcement and interdiction components through the timely analysis and dissemination of intelligence on illicit drug and alien movements, and criminal organizations responsible for these illegal activities, within the United States, on both sides of the U.S.- Mexico border, across the Caribbean, and from other points of origin within the Western Hemisphere en route to the United States.

[7] Disputes regarding NDIC's access to information from the Intelligence Community and Federal law enforcement agencies should be referred to the head of the department or agency concerned for resolution.

[8] A description of the "reports analyst" implementation proposal is contained in Action Item E-18.

This mission refocuses EPIC's efforts on drug trafficking in the Western Hemisphere rather than worldwide to make EPIC more responsive to its customers' needs and threats impacting the United States.

B-9. Management and Program Coordination: EPIC will remain under the direct line authority of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the interagency makeup of EPIC will be continued, but the EPIC Advisory Board will be abolished. Direct management responsibility for EPIC rests with the EPIC Director, who will collaborate with senior law enforcement representatives at EPIC from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the U.S. Customs Service (USCS), and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). A Principals Group composed of intelligence chiefs of the DEA, FBI, USCS, INS, and Coast Guard has been established to provide internal interagency management and coordination. The CDICG will provide guidance to the EPIC Principals Group and the EPIC Director to ensure that EPIC's activities and products are consistent with its mission, are not duplicative of taskings or reporting of other national centers (to include NDIC and FinCEN), and meet national interagency counterdrug community requirements.

B-10. Program Priorities: EPIC's activities will focus on operational and investigative intelligence support to drug law enforcement, with emphasis on the Center's existing top-priority operational programs like the 24-hour Watch function. Emphasis will also be placed on domestic interdiction and training programs such as PIPELINE, CONVOY, and JETWAY. EPIC's Maritime Lookout Watch will continue to provide support to both the Caribbean and Pacific areas, and receive reporting on all suspect vessel drug trafficking worldwide that may affect the United States. Focusing on the Southwest Border, the Southeast Border, the Caribbean, and contiguous seas and airspace, EPIC also will provide regional analysis to identify drug trafficking trends and patterns associated with those regions, and issue timely reports as appropriate. EPIC will ensure these reports are coordinated with NDIC so that there is no duplication. The EPIC Director, in coordination with other senior center managers, will review ongoing projects for consistency with the EPIC mission statement.

B-11. Relationship with State and Local Law Enforcement: EPIC should strengthen its relationship with state and local law enforcement components throughout the country, including greater state and local participation. The Center will review and update its agreements with each state to increase the number of state and local contacts permitted to directly access and request EPIC services. EPIC will further improve the ease by which state and local law enforcement can coordinate with the Center, to include information technology applications to supplement current telephonic inquiries. As a major national center in the new drug intelligence architecture, EPIC will serve as a clearinghouse and will work with the HIDTA Intelligence Centers, gathering state and local law enforcement drug intelligence requirements and providing drug intelligence and information back to the HIDTA Intelligence Centers.

B-12. Development of a Nationwide System to Report Drug Seizures to EPIC: The Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat (CDX), in cooperation with EPIC and its

various state points-of-contact, HIDTA Intelligence Centers, DEA, and RISSes, will coordinate the development of a process to capture drug seizure data at the state and local levels. The objective will then be to aggregate the data from the Federal-wide Drug Seizure System (FDSS) and the state/local initiative into a common database reflecting seizures nationwide. DEA administers the FDSS to account for drug seizures and avoid multiple counting. The system is an effective accounting mechanism for Federal seizures and a useful tool in the analysis of trafficking activity. State and local law enforcement seizure reporting, however, is not similarly aggregated. The development of this new process, working toward a common, aggregate database of seizures nationwide, will help incorporate the substantial contributions of state and local drug law enforcement agencies into the overall counterdrug effort—contributions that may now be lost, underappreciated, and not analyzed for their intelligence potential.

B-13. EPIC Watch Program: EPIC management should take steps to reduce the number of special agents assigned to the Watch Program, replacing them with investigative assistants. Additionally, EPIC will increase the number of analysts assigned to perform first-phase intelligence analysis on data generated by the Watch. EPIC will also increase the number of incoming drug movement and seizure reports upon which their analysts generate self-initiated tactical reports or supplemental commentary reports back to the providing component and/or to other affected law enforcement or interdiction components.

B-14. Hub for HIDTA Intelligence Centers: EPIC will centrally receive and share drug movement-related information developed by the HIDTA Intelligence Centers and ensure that the EPIC Watch and relevant database checks are a standard part of appropriate HIDTA operational protocols.

B-15. JICC Program Review: The CDICG will commission an interagency review of the Joint Information Coordination Centers (JICC) program (which is designed to consolidate data on suspect individuals, aircraft, and marine vessels in designated Caribbean and Latin American countries) and will report on the continued viability of the JICC Program.

The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network

B-16: Mission: The mission statement of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network shall be:

To support law enforcement investigative efforts and foster interagency and global cooperation against domestic and international financial crimes; and to provide U.S. policymakers with strategic analyses of domestic and worldwide money-laundering developments, trends, and patterns. FinCEN will work toward those ends through information collection, analysis, and sharing, as well as technological assistance, and innovative, cost-effective implementation of Treasury authorities.

B-17. Strategic Intelligence: FinCEN has the potential to play a central role in the U.S. drug control program. To that end, a near-term objective for FinCEN is to significantly increase its strategic intelligence role without diminishing the quality of the critical case support that it currently provides to law enforcement. Under this objective, FinCEN and the Treasury Department will undertake initiatives devoted to broader, strategic-level analyses of money laundering and other illicit business transactions related to the drug trade.

B-18. Access to Intelligence Reporting: FinCEN will improve its mechanisms for the receipt and exploitation of law enforcement-sensitive data and classified intelligence. FinCEN analysts will more actively participate in interagency counterdrug programs and provide financial analysis to support interagency assessments. FinCEN's analysts will exercise their unique expertise in routinely reviewing, analyzing, and producing assessments based upon Intelligence Community reporting on known or suspected drug-related financial transactions and activities.

Section C:
Regional, State, and Local Cooperation

Introduction

The overall success of national enforcement efforts to combat the availability and use of illegal drugs in the United States depends in great measure on the effectiveness of state and local law enforcement efforts. The decentralized nature of law enforcement makes it difficult to implement a comprehensive counterdrug intelligence system. Federal drug law enforcement agencies rely heavily on the input and participation of state and local organizations in task forces and multiagency investigations. The challenge is to leverage resources and existing Federal, state, and local cooperative mechanisms such as Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) task forces, Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs), High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs), the Regional Information Sharing System (RISS), U.S. Attorneys' Offices, the High-Risk Money-Laundering and Related Financial Crimes Areas (HIFCAs), and others, to maximize interagency and intercommunity effectiveness.

Some 17,000 Federal, regional, state, local, and tribal law enforcement and support entities exist. Often agencies operate autonomously, frequently with overlapping jurisdictions, and are supported by multiple authorities, procedures, and systems. Drug investigators increasingly have joined together in local or regional task force programs for coordination and support. Multicomponent task forces and HIDTAs, in particular, have multiplied. All serve to advance local or regional cooperation, but require enhanced national and multiregional coordination. This expanded coordination will improve operational effectiveness and help reduce jurisdictional and funding competitiveness.

The regional or local intelligence centers associated with many of these programs are intended to be strongly tactical, augmenting the development of individual cases. However, they do not routinely generate meaningful systematic trend and pattern analyses which would be useful for investigations conducted on a national or international scale.

A typical, large U.S. metropolitan area has the DEA, FBI, Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI), Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), U.S. Customs Service, state, county, and city police forces, and Federal, state, city, and county prosecutors carrying out drug investigations, interdictions, and prosecutions in support of their respective missions and jurisdictions. Many have their own intelligence capabilities, and many participate in joint task forces. Information is shared among agencies predominately through interpersonal communication, on a case-by-case basis. Accommodating the complexity of U.S. law enforcement, in terms of the number of agencies and agent-level information-sharing practices, is a central challenge of a common counterdrug intelligence-sharing system.

This section of the GCIP presents 13 action items to further enhance regional, state, and local cooperative efforts.

C-1. Consolidation of Drug Intelligence Resources: In major metropolitan areas, Federal law enforcement agencies and the HIDTA Intelligence Centers, where they exist, will take steps to consolidate, or at least collocate, core drug intelligence-gathering and -reporting components, including information systems terminal access. Agencies will retain, as they consider appropriate, their own intelligence units to serve their individual requirements. Such units should endeavor to coordinate efforts and share information with other drug intelligence organizations in their region. In geographic areas identified by the Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating Group (CDICG), participating agencies, with the support of the Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat (CDX), will review the feasibility and efficacy of consolidating or collocating the drug intelligence functions of the various agencies.

C-2. Dedication of Intelligence Analysts to Produce Sanitized Reports: Law enforcement information sharing can be markedly and actively enhanced by establishing a capability to generate and disseminate sanitized reports of current law enforcement investigative information to their counterpart law enforcement agencies at the Federal, state, and local levels. Doing so necessitates the dedication of a cadre of intelligence analysts in the Federal law enforcement agencies, especially DEA, FBI, and U.S. Customs Service headquarters and field offices. Their primary mission is to ensure that timely and high-value, but not case-sensitive, information is provided to those with a need-to-know, while protecting sensitive, undercover, and legally-restricted law enforcement sources, information, individuals, and techniques. The law enforcement community needs a reporting capability comparable to the Intelligence Community's reports officer to "push out" valuable information from the law enforcement field offices to their own headquarters elements. This information would be further disseminated to the drug intelligence community, as appropriate, to augment their analyses and focus collection tasking. Law enforcement should not generate these reports at the expense of direct case support. FY 2000 resource levels are not programmed to accommodate these initiatives. (See Action Item E-18 for training implications.)

C-3. Federal Participation in HIDTA Intelligence Centers: The mission of the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Program is to enhance and coordinate America's drug-control efforts among Federal, state, and local agencies in order to eliminate or reduce drug trafficking (including the production, manufacture, transportation, distribution, and chronic use of illegal drugs and money laundering) and its harmful consequences in critical areas of the United States.

The establishment of intelligence centers in each HIDTA is a recent Federally funded, yet locally implemented, intelligence initiative. The participation of Federal, state, and local drug law enforcement agencies in these centers will provide a local forum for interagency information gathering and exchange. HIDTA Intelligence Centers must be fully integrated into the local counterdrug law enforcement information architecture. Federal agencies should participate actively in each HIDTA and its Intelligence Center.

C-4. Development of Guidelines for HIDTA Intelligence Centers: The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), in coordination with the CDX and Federal, state, and local agencies participating in the HIDTA Program, will develop comprehensive intelligence-related policies and guidelines for HIDTA Intelligence Centers.

C-5. Establishment of Core Functions and Services for HIDTA Intelligence Centers: HIDTA Intelligence Centers differ in their level of development, due largely to regional needs and local HIDTA Executive Committee decisions. To a lesser degree, the Centers vary because of limited national oversight and guidance provided to the HIDTAs. As the HIDTA Program continues to develop, ONDCP will provide program guidance for a set of core services and functions for HIDTA Intelligence Centers:

(1) The mission of the HIDTA Intelligence Centers is to facilitate the timely exchange of information among Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies participating in the HIDTA area of responsibility. In part, this will be accomplished by encouraging automated database access to, and initiating automated systems messaging connectivity among, Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and law enforcement national centers and their enforcement databases, to include the Global Justice Information Network (Global);

(2) Establish event and case deconfliction systems using commercial or government off-the-shelf technology where the systems do not already exist;

(3) Develop drug threat assessments for HIDTA areas of responsibility (see Action Item C-12, below);

(4) Conduct post-seizure analysis[9] of major seizures related to HIDTA initiatives;

(5) Assist participating state and local enforcement agencies in reporting drug seizures to EPIC for inclusion in the database supporting the Federal-wide Drug Seizure System;

(6) Participate in on-line intelligence reporting systems that can be used on a state, regional, or national basis; and,

(7) Provide a photo-imaging network capability that would permit Federal, state, and local jurisdictions to share arrest photographs and biographic data for arrestees in the area. These efforts should comport with the National Crime Information Center 2000 and the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System planned to provide digital photo imaging capability.

C-6. Expansion of Document Exploitation (DOCEX) Capabilities: ONDCP will support the establishment of six initial DOCEX teams at designated regional intelligence centers. ONDCP—in coordination with the various HIDTA Executive Committees, and

[9]Post-seizure analysis would include immediate exploitation of data as well as follow-up exploitation for intelligence purposes and comprehensive dissemination of analysis results.

in consultation with the CDICG—will select six HIDTA Intelligence Centers to establish a document exploitation capability. FY 2000 resources are not programmed for this new initiative. National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) document exploitation and computer forensics specialists—in conjunction with the Justice Training Center—will help train these DOCEX analysts. NDIC, as reflected in Action Item B-7, will continue to provide priority DOCEX support services until these designated elements are capable of serving their regions. At that time, the CDICG will evaluate the NDIC role as a continuing DOCEX regional or nationwide surge support and training assistance provider. ONDCP, in coordination with NDIC, DEA, FBI, and CDX, will develop protocols for the use of these teams.

C-7. Management of HIDTA Intelligence Centers: ONDCP, in coordination with the CDX and the Federal, state, and local agencies participating in the HIDTA Program, will issue guidelines to ensure the HIDTA Intelligence Centers have dual Federal-state/local management with a single line supervisor. The supervisor of the Intelligence Center will be a sworn Federal, state, or local law enforcement officer or a law enforcement intelligence analyst appointed by one of the managing agencies and approved by the HIDTA Executive Committee. The supervisor must have appropriate Federal law enforcement clearances.

C-8. HIDTA Intelligence Center Information Sharing and Access: Agencies participating in HIDTA Intelligence Centers will provide Center personnel with on-site, direct access to their agency's pertinent databases, whenever possible and in accordance with existing Federal and state regulations. HIDTA Intelligence Centers are less effective where staff do not have access and connectivity to participating agency-specific data systems such as DEA's Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Information System (NADDIS), FBI's Automated Case Support System (ACS), or the Treasury Enforcement Computer System (TECS). Center personnel should be cross-designated to grant direct access to other participating agencies' databases whenever possible. If direct access by Center personnel to participating agencies' databases is not possible, dedicated personnel will be assigned to the Intelligence Center from the participating agency to ensure access to its information.

C-9. Funding of Background Investigations for HIDTA Intelligence Center Employees: ONDCP and the individual HIDTAs will budget for the requisite background investigations for HIDTA Intelligence Center personnel. The lack of background investigations for some HIDTA Intelligence Center employees has sometimes prevented access to available information. The Federal agency jointly managing the HIDTA Intelligence Center will be responsible for arranging for background investigations for non-Federal Center personnel. Granting Federal law enforcement clearances to HIDTA Intelligence Center personnel satisfies one prerequisite for access to law enforcement databases, because the clearances granted by one agency are recognized by the other agencies. The standards for granting clearances will not be lowered.

C-10. Eligibility of HIDTA Intelligence Center Personnel to Receive Law Enforcement Information: EPIC will work with the individual states to revise its Memoranda of Understanding to designate HIDTA Intelligence Center authorized personnel as eligible to make inquiries to EPIC and receive law enforcement information, provided that they satisfy the management guidelines of Action Item C-7, and have appropriate background investigations per Action Item C-9. Similarly, the Bureau of Justice Assistance will revise its guidelines to designate HIDTA Intelligence Centers as eligible to join RISSes, have target input capability, and receive law enforcement information.

C-11. Production of Regional Threat Assessments: Coordinated threat assessments that aggregate and analyze intelligence on the drug problem within specific regions, Federal jurisdictions, metropolitan areas, and cities are needed—and in many instances are produced—by authorities at all levels. Examples include DEA annual and quarterly drug threat and trend reports, Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) regional drug threat assessments, and HIDTA area drug threat assessments. NDIC will produce the annual, domestic National Drug Threat Assessment by combining and analyzing all information provided by Federal, state, and local law enforcement, HIDTAs, and other sources. NDIC will also produce complementary drug threat assessments for geographic regions.

C-12. Production of HIDTA Area Drug Threat Assessments: HIDTA Intelligence Centers will produce consolidated and coordinated annual interagency drug threat assessments for their areas. In addition to drawing upon Federal, state, and local law enforcement and other sources within their areas, these HIDTA assessments will draw upon the district crime and drug assessments prepared by the U.S. Attorneys' Offices and regional drug threat assessments prepared by the OCDETF Regional Advisory Councils. Copies of these threat assessments will be provided to NDIC. To ensure the appropriate scope and depth of HIDTA threat assessments, ONDCP, with input from NDIC, the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, and the OCDETF program of the Department of Justice, and others, will develop the format for the HIDTA area threat assessments.

C-13. Participation of Federal Agencies in the National Drug Pointer Index (NDPIX) System: NDPIX is a fully automated pointer system developed by state and local law enforcement, in conjunction with the DEA. NDPIX serves as a valuable investigative coordination and criminal subject deconfliction mechanism and is accessible through the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System. Federal agencies, to include FBI, DEA, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Marshals Service, will plan full participation in NDPIX within two years. NDPIX will be used in support of case/subject deconfliction. NDPIX is a powerful investigative tool that will provide participating state, local, and Federal law enforcement personnel with pointer information relative to active drug targets.

Section D:
Foreign Coordination

Introduction

This section of the General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) addresses the international dimension of the counterdrug intelligence architecture. The action items in this section further enhance the already strong relationships among U.S. counterdrug components operating overseas. They will promote a more robust counterdrug effort between the United States and its allies in the international counterdrug community. This section addresses seven issue areas and advances 12 action items.

Improving counterdrug leadership and coordination in U.S. Missions

The quality and effectiveness of interaction and coordination among the various components involved in counterdrug support vary widely in U.S. Missions abroad. Where most effective, the U.S. Mission leadership clearly defines its oversight responsibility, is well informed, attends to program details, and structures an environment for interagency information sharing. Where it falters, it lacks structure and relies almost solely on the personalities of the U.S. Mission members.

D-1. U.S. Mission Counterdrug Program Coordinator: The Senior Narcotics and Law Enforcement Coordinator appointed by the Chief of Mission pursuant to the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-277) will ensure that U.S. Mission components focus on common drug control matters.

D-2. Structured Information Exchange: The Coordinator will establish and oversee a structured program of information exchange and program coordination among U.S. Mission leaders, and will be assisted by the senior Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) supervisor in the U.S. Mission. Consistent with agencies' authorities and procedures, U.S. Mission members will continue to conduct drug intelligence activities required by their agencies, in coordination with the U.S. Mission Coordinator. The coordination function provides a systematic approach for meeting interagency and intercommunity drug intelligence requirements. The Coordinator's function is to facilitate a team approach to these drug intelligence requirements.

D-3. U.S. Mission Orientation: Each U.S. Mission should also tailor its own in-house orientation procedures for arriving counterdrug component employees, emphasizing:

(1) An overview of the local counterdrug program operating environment;
(2) Familiarization with post counterdrug component key personnel, responsibilities, and program capabilities; and,
(3) Familiarization with intercomponent mechanisms and procedures in place for information sharing and coordination.

D-4. U.S. Mission Reviews: Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat (CDX) staff officers will communicate with and visit U.S. Missions with a significant drug-related responsibility, after obtaining the necessary country clearance from the Chief of Mission. The CDX, in coordination with the Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating Group (CDICG) and appropriate headquarters components, will update the Missions on changes in the counterdrug intelligence community, and assist the U.S. Missions by reviewing the effectiveness of drug intelligence and information sharing, coordination, and cooperation. The visiting team members will provide observations and recommendations to the U.S. Mission members and the Chief of Mission. Visit results will be included in the CDICG semiannual report.

D-5. Intercommunity Counterdrug Coordination Processes: The existing intercommunity counterdrug coordination processes will continue to assist U.S. Missions to identify, set priorities for, and coordinate their efforts against the most significant drug traffickers and their drug trade business sectors in Latin America and in Southeast/Southwest Asia. These processes provide a regular forum for multiple U.S. Mission coordination efforts against designated targets through planning meetings and regional U.S. Mission conferences.

Improving counterdrug intelligence dissemination to host nations

The United States is a signatory to a series of bilateral, multilateral, subregional, regional, and global accords that create a strong backdrop for effective counterdrug measures. To enhance the effectiveness of counterdrug activities in foreign countries, counterdrug intelligence must be available to authorized host nation enforcement officials. Current mechanisms for obtaining approval to release such intelligence are often cumbersome and time-consuming.

D-6. Sharing Intelligence with Foreign Counterparts: The CDICG will coordinate the development of a comprehensive interagency system, governed by adequate policy direction, to facilitate the secure and timely sharing by U.S. Mission components of drug intelligence and information with allies and counterdrug partner nations. This system must ensure that host nation personnel follow policy guidelines and protocols and that there is accountability for information provided. It also must be flexible enough to account for the sensitivity of the information as well as the requirement for timeliness. Agencies producing drug intelligence of use to host nations will ensure, consistent with U.S. national security and foreign policy goals, that this intelligence is provided in a "tearline" or "release to" format in original reporting, for timely release to specific authorized foreign counterparts. In selected nations, the Department of Defense should continue to maintain existing secure information transmission systems and determine whether these systems are adequate for the originating agency of the U.S. Mission to be able to provide time-critical information to authorized and designated host nation counterparts.

Enhancing intelligence on foreign commercial drug smuggling activities

Domestically, the U.S. Customs Service has broad authority to pursue investigations, to seize contraband, and to order merchandise forfeited in support of its border mission. However, for drug smuggling issues internationally, Customs' legal authorities are subordinated to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Under a 1984 DEA/U.S. Customs Service Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), U.S. Customs Service has relied on DEA for foreign-based drug law enforcement information.

The White House Task Force *Review of the U.S. Counterdrug Intelligence Centers and Activities* identified the need to increase expertise in the foreign collection and exploitation of intelligence addressing drug smuggling in commercial conveyances. The Review recommended that multidiscipline teams consisting of U.S. Customs Service investigators, inspectors, and intelligence analysts be forward-deployed on a permanent basis to U.S. Missions. Their objective would be to collect commercial drug smuggling intelligence in support of their interdiction mission at the U.S. border and share it with the U.S. Mission, and other members of the counterdrug community.

D-7. U.S. Customs Service Drug Intelligence Personnel Overseas: Pursuant to the recommendations of the White House Task Force, the DEA and U.S. Customs Service executed a supplement to their 1984 MOU in August 1999. The new MOU recognizes and addresses the need for U.S. Customs Service to actively participate in gathering critical foreign drug intelligence as part of the national counterdrug effort, while reaffirming DEA's role as the U.S. Government's single point-of-contact for drug law enforcement issues overseas. Consistent with NSDD-38 and with host nation approval, U.S. Customs Service will ensure adequate drug intelligence teams are in the Country Offices under the auspices of the DEA Country Attaché. Consistent with Chief of Mission authority, the U.S. Customs Service teams' tasking will be determined by the Intelligence Division, U.S. Customs Service headquarters, but will be communicated to them and coordinated through the respective DEA Country Attachés.

U.S. Customs Service proposes a phased approach to its personnel deployments, commencing with a small number of temporary assignments followed by permanent placement of drug intelligence teams in selected Latin American and Asian countries. Follow-on phases will include other countries and additional personnel as U.S. Customs Service foreign response to the drug threat evolves.

Increasing drug intelligence law enforcement analytic capability overseas

U.S. Missions in major drug-producing and transit countries need counterdrug analytic and planning support. FY 2000 resources are not programmed to provide a sufficient number of trained law enforcement analysts.

D-8. DEA Intelligence Analysts Overseas: Under this GCIP and consistent with NSDD-38, the Department of Justice will ensure that the appropriate number of permanent analyst positions are assigned to DEA country offices overseas.

Enhancing Department of Defense (DoD) foreign counterdrug intelligence support

DoD provides critical intelligence support for foreign counterdrug efforts at the national, regional, and U.S. Mission levels. Much of the DoD direct counterdrug support to U.S. Missions is coordinated under the various Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs) maintained under DoD's U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) and Pacific Command (PACOM). To further consolidate and improve these ongoing support efforts, DoD merged the two JIATFs that had been operating separately under USSOUTHCOM: JIATF-South at Howard AFB, Panama, was merged into JIATF-East at Key West, Florida.

D-9. Coordination of the JIATFs: DoD coordinates and integrates the intelligence responsibilities of PACOM's JIATF-West in Alameda, California, with JIATF-East in Key West, to more effectively support detection and monitoring and interdiction efforts against illegal drug movements in the eastern Pacific Ocean that originate in or transit Latin America. Because these Joint Interagency Task Forces are critical to U.S. interdiction efforts, the CDICG will work with the appropriate Federal agencies to ensure that these services meet counterdrug community needs.

D-10. Tactical Analysis Teams' Staffing: DoD will streamline and improve the staffing and management of its Tactical Analysis Teams (TATs), which are the focal points of DoD counterdrug support for U.S. Missions throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. The TATs fall under the operational oversight of DEA and support U.S. Missions by providing on-site analytic assistance. Because TAT positions are filled on a temporary duty basis, frequent turnover and varying levels of training, experience, and skill of the personnel assigned to them adversely affect many TATs. To improve the continuity and focus, DoD will work with the State Department and with the U.S. Missions in these regions to designate TAT Chiefs' billets, and certain Deputy Chiefs' billets, as two-year (minimum) permanent positions. DoD will standardize its prerequisite qualifications and en route training requirements for individuals selected for all TAT positions.

Increasing attention to foreign drug-related illicit finances

To attack both the means and ends of criminal trafficking enterprises in the United States and abroad, more intelligence is required on their financial operations and relationships. Our counterdrug intelligence and law enforcement communities need more comprehensive and in-depth strategic assessments of drug-related money laundering and other financial crimes, both on the foreign and domestic scenes. This will require that the contributing agencies develop additional expertise and undertake more intelligence

collection efforts. Both the Intelligence Community, with the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC) as its lead counterdrug element, and the law enforcement community, with the Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) as its lead element, are increasing efforts directed against foreign drug-related money laundering and associated illicit business and financial activities. Concurrently, CNC and FinCEN will coordinate with each other and enhance both their information-sharing efforts and their support for enforcement efforts against illicit drug-related financial activities.

D-11. Drug Money Laundering Assessments: Both CNC and FinCEN, in close coordination with other components, will collaborate on the enhanced production of finished intelligence assessments for national policymakers and senior law enforcement officials on worldwide drug money laundering and illicit financial activities. These assessments will address the amounts of money involved; the means by which they are moved or laundered; the extent to which they flow abroad; the involvement of known or suspected business and banking enterprises; and the recipients to which they are directed.

Clarifying legal and policy guidelines on law enforcement and intelligence coordination

In many U.S. Missions abroad, staff officers still experience uncertainty about interactions and information sharing between the two communities.

D-12. Legal Policy Guidelines and Procedures: Under this GCIP, the CDX will work with the Department of Justice, State Department, the Intelligence Community, and Federal law enforcement agencies to facilitate development and dissemination of guidelines such as were recommended by the 1997 Joint Intelligence Community/Law Enforcement Working Group (JICLE), and approved by the Deputy Attorney General and Acting Director of Central Intelligence, for coordination of activities and sharing of information within the counterdrug community. Further, counterdrug community components will reduce the guidelines to procedures, as much as practical, for U.S. Missions, domestic offices, and headquarters. The CDICG will periodically review the application and effectiveness of the procedures.

Section E:
Analytic Personnel Development and Training

Introduction

This section of the General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) brings necessary attention to analytic personnel development and training. The action items delineated below will strengthen the drug law enforcement community's intelligence structure and enhance the abilities of law enforcement drug intelligence analysts and staff. At the same time, better understanding of the legitimate differences in philosophies and policies of Federal law enforcement and Intelligence Community agencies will enable them to perform as a true community and to deliver fully coordinated drug intelligence. The analyst function within law enforcement agencies—designed primarily to support on-going investigations and prosecutions—will be more clearly defined, with a structured career path.

This section, consisting of five issue areas and 20 action items, will advance Federal law enforcement efforts to enhance their analytic capabilities in partnership with the Intelligence Community and with the state and local law enforcement communities. This Plan recognizes that Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies have similar drug intelligence analyst training and education needs. It highlights the need for an interagency, agreed-upon, exportable core drug intelligence curriculum to serve those needs. It proposes a leadership role for the Justice Training Center (JTC) to develop those exportable courses. It recognizes that some introductory, intermediate, and special advanced law enforcement intelligence analyst training courses might be more efficiently delivered through a centralized academy, the requirements for which warrant thorough, interagency review.

Developing staffing plans and establishing standardized hiring criteria

E-1. Federal Analytic Staff: For the FY 2002 budget, the Departments of Justice (DOJ), Transportation, and Treasury should have in place a three-year staffing plan that supports initiatives encompassed by the GCIP and actively recruits for existing vacancies. This presupposes—and encourages—that agencies support current initiatives by actively recruiting for existing vacancies and meeting obligations to detail staff to national centers.

E-2. State and Local Support: The Department of Justice, in conjunction with Federal law enforcement agencies and the Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat (CDX), will explore additional ways to deploy drug intelligence assistance—analytic and technological—in support of state and local agencies. This should include a thorough assessment to determine if existing programs such as the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) and Making Officer Redeployment Effective (MORE) may be

leveraged. If DOJ finds this to be a viable course, appropriate statutes should be modified to allow for an expansion of COPS/MORE into intelligence support.

E-3. Standardized Minimum Intelligence Analyst Hiring Criteria: To better ensure recruitment of intelligence analysts with top skills and expertise, Federal law enforcement agencies may require a Bachelor's degree or equivalent combination of experience or training, when supported by a valid job analysis.

Professionalizing of Federal law enforcement drug Intelligence Analysts

E-4. Establishment of Career Ladder for Federal Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts: Each Federal law enforcement agency should create uniform career ladders for its drug intelligence analysts that include minimum selection criteria, basic, intermediate, and advanced training opportunities, and standardized promotion guidelines. The training opportunities should include not only those of the parent enforcement agency, but also those offered by other law enforcement agencies, the military, and the Intelligence Community. Specialized training should be provided for intelligence analysts assigned overseas. Analysts will be given expanded opportunities for advancement into management or specialized support areas. Supervisory intelligence analyst positions will be created in the field as well as at headquarters to assure professional analytic management of intelligence support to enforcement agents and to provide greater analytic expertise and subject matter continuity in mentoring less experienced analysts. Interagency assignments will be encouraged to enhance analysts' knowledge of other agencies' operations and systems, facilitate information sharing, and establish an *esprit de corps* among fellow professionals.

E-5. Management and Leadership Training Programs: Each Federal law enforcement agency will develop a one-year Career Management Training Program for drug intelligence analysts with demonstrated management and leadership potential. During this year, the analysts will serve a period of months in the agency's key divisions and will be required to complete at least one 4- to 8-week special assignment outside the agency.

E-6. Leadership Program Opportunities: Federal law enforcement agencies will arrange for select intelligence analysts at the GS-13 to -15 levels to compete for senior management and leadership programs, such as those offered at Harvard's JFK School of Government, the National War College, the Joint Military Intelligence College, the Foreign Service Institute, and Intelligence Community agencies.

E-7. Development of a Master's Degree in Law Enforcement Intelligence: The JTC will plan to contract with universities in the Washington, D.C., area and in two or three other U.S. cities to design a certified Master's Degree program in law enforcement intelligence. This should be a one- to two-year program covering areas of criminal justice, intelligence, foreign affairs, technology, and national security.

E-8. Justice-Treasury Drug Intelligence Fellowship: The Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury should consider sponsoring a Justice-Treasury Drug Intelligence Fellowship, a one-year program for post-graduates and mid-career professionals inside and outside government. Working closely with Federal enforcement agencies, the Fellows will research leading drug intelligence issues of interest to the Departments—for example, commercial and trade intelligence, money laundering, technology, international cooperation, cyber-finance, and cyber-crime.

E-9. Expansion of Federal Law Enforcement Intelligence Programs: Federal law enforcement agencies should continue to design their intelligence career programs to place supervisory intelligence analysts in each field office. In the field and at headquarters, the first-line supervision of intelligence analysts should be a Supervisory Intelligence Research Specialist.

E-10. Expansion of Federal Law Enforcement Drug Intelligence Analyst Rotational Tours: Within one year, Federal law enforcement agencies should develop a plan to expand their numbers of drug analysts and Special Agents serving in rotational or exchange tours at headquarters and field sites in other Federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies, or in multicomponent national centers such as the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN).

E-11. Drug Intelligence Issue Experts: Federal law enforcement agencies should designate certain non-supervisory GS-14 and GS-15 positions as key drug intelligence issue experts. This is especially important for agencies such as the FBI and U.S. Customs Service, which have jurisdiction for multiple violations, in order to avoid diverting drug intelligence expertise to other mission areas. These analysts, because of their skill and expertise, also should be used extensively in training and as mentors to junior analysts.

Training and education

E-12. National Training Center for Drug Intelligence: The JTC will become the principal national center for Federal drug law enforcement intelligence training and education. The JTC will not supplant the authorities of other Federal agencies and departments involved in drug intelligence training and education. The DOJ is considering, in close collaboration with NDIC and other appropriate centers, an interagency process to develop national standards to further professionalize drug intelligence analyst training and education. Other Federal training and education centers should continue to offer drug intelligence analysts courses that are specific to their Departments' missions. The Intelligence Community, military, and state and local drug law enforcement analysts will also benefit from JTC drug intelligence training and education. For the JTC to be able to serve the interests of all agencies involved in the counterdrug effort, staffing and resources must be identified.

E-13. Standardized Training and Education: The JTC will develop a comprehensive drug intelligence training and education curriculum for analysts and other personnel, from entry- to supervisory-level, including management and leadership training, for Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. The JTC should consider offering drug intelligence education and training programs to Federal, state, and local law enforcement analysts and other personnel. Law enforcement agencies with drug support missions will include drug intelligence courses as part of their entry-level specialist training curricula. Training for Special Agents should also include a module on the drug intelligence and analytic services that intelligence analysts provide. The JTC will develop innovative ideas concerning the fusion of law enforcement and Intelligence Community training approaches and perspectives.

E-14. National Training Centers Coordination: JTC should work closely with other Federal Training Centers, particularly NDIC and Treasury's Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), located at Glynco, Georgia, to develop an interagency-approved, exportable core drug intelligence curriculum for use by Federal, state, and local law enforcement and analytic personnel. JTC should draw intelligence instructors from all agencies with drug intelligence expertise, including intelligence, military, and Federal, state, and local law enforcement. This should include the use of instructors and expertise from FLETC and its Financial Fraud Institute, NDIC, and other national centers. JTC will take advantage of various training sites around the country, with particular emphasis placed on the use of long-distance, distributed learning, to include video teleconference training.

E-l5. Interagency Task Force: The DOJ will create an interagency task force to examine the requirements, concept, and justification for an academy for criminal and drug intelligence at the JTC in Quantico, Virginia. It is imperative that such an examination has senior executive support of the law enforcement, intelligence, and military communities. DOJ, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and the Defense, Transportation, and Treasury Departments will support this task force effort.

E-16. Five-Year Plan: To ensure the requisite interagency support for this academy, if recommended, the JTC will prepare a comprehensive five-year plan that addresses the program's interagency staffing requirements, curricula, funding, and plans to interface with or engage various other national training centers.

E-17. Coordination of Training and Education Initiatives: The Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating Group (CDICG) will work closely with each of the participating departmental and agency training facilities that provide drug analysis training and education courses in order to promote better coordination, standardization, and consistency of drug analytic methodologies and operating procedures. Principal coordination will be conducted with the JTC, NDIC, FLETC, the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Assistance Center, the Joint Military Intelligence Training Center, and the interagency Training for Intelligence and Law Enforcement (TILE)

program, which seeks to promote coordination and cross-training opportunities for drug specialists in law enforcement agencies and in the Intelligence Community.

Establishing a cadre of intelligence analysts to produce timely sanitized reports for the counterdrug community

E-18. Resource and Training Requirements for "Reports Analyst" Function: To enable Federal law enforcement agencies to produce sanitized reports of current investigative information to share with other law enforcement components and the Intelligence Community (see Action Item C-2) will require additional training. FY 2000 resources are not programmed to provide this cadre.

(1) Federal drug law enforcement agencies, particularly DEA, FBI, and U.S. Customs Service, will ensure adequate numbers of analysts are at both the headquarters and field levels. Analytic staffing enhancements necessary to perform this function will be identified in each agency's staffing plans; and,

(2) The JTC will oversee the development of the needed training courses. Intelligence personnel at both the headquarters and field levels will be trained to apply procedures to extract and disseminate the information from one agency to another while protecting sensitive undercover and legally restricted law enforcement sources, information, and techniques.

Decreasing reliance on military intelligence analyst support

E-19. Analysts' Job Focus: Professionalizing the intelligence analytic cadre at Federal law enforcement agencies (see Action Items E-3 through E-8) requires that intelligence analysts will no longer perform data-entry tasks and other nonanalytic-related tasks such as technical or graphics support, but rather focus on the job for which they were hired—research and analysis. FY 2000 support staffing levels do not permit this. Agencies should establish staffing modules for the appropriate ratios of Special Agents, analysts, and support personnel.

E-20. Decreased Reliance on the Military: Over the past decade, law enforcement agencies have increasingly come to rely upon military detailees (National Guard, active duty, and reservists) to provide analytic support to domestic and foreign activities. Law enforcement reliance on military analytic support to domestic field offices can and should be significantly reduced. Military support should then be required only in special cases, because these law enforcement agencies will have strengthened their own cadre of intelligence analyst and associated support capabilities. In the foreign arena, law enforcement agencies will also seek to ensure adequate numbers of analysts are at U.S. Missions in key drug-producing or transit countries, thereby decreasing their reliance on the military analytic support overseas for other than highly specialized support.

Section F:
Information Technology

Introduction

Drug intelligence analysts must be supported by effective, secure, and powerful information systems. The drug intelligence centers and activities require an architecture that permits rapid access by authorized analysts to all relevant information sources; quick information retrieval and sorting; secure information transfer among organizations; and tools to manipulate and analyze the information. Existing information technology and communications systems in the law enforcement community require large-scale improvements in secure interconnectivity. FY 2000 resource levels are not programmed to accommodate these initiatives.

The state of systems architectures today is much improved over that of August 1992, when the *National Drug Control Information Resource Management Plan* was published under Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) auspices. The Intelligence Community has achieved significant advancements that address many of the requirements for interagency information sharing in the national security realm. For example, secure Internet-type technology has been implemented in the Top Secret environment. The law enforcement community has completed numerous improvements in overall automation across the Federal, state, and local levels. Notable examples of improved automation include DRUG-X, the Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) Firebird and Merlin systems, and the National Drug Pointer Index (NDPIX). There are also several positive information-handling and -sharing initiatives involving law enforcement, the Intelligence Community, military components, and regional organizations. Some examples are the Department of Defense-sponsored interagency Anti-Drug Network (ADNET), and the Department of Justice-administered Regional Information Sharing System Network (RISSNET).

Despite these successes, no single organization's system can provide electronic access to all of the drug law enforcement information that is available to support ongoing investigations and analyses. The frequent inability of the various law enforcement and Intelligence Community agencies to share the appropriate data in an expeditious manner, or at all, is still a critical shortcoming.

The key concepts underlying the systems architecture plan defined in this section are the following:

(1) No agency or level of government has all the drug intelligence available;

(2) Information sharing is critical to ensuring success—there must be a level of information sharing across all political boundaries (including international, national/Federal, regional, state, and local government entities) and within all

security levels (including Top Secret, Secret, Sensitive But Unclassified, and purely Unclassified);

(3) Security is a mandatory precursor to information sharing;

(4) The legal and policy barriers to effective information sharing must be clearly identified, and accommodated or eliminated, where appropriate, to enable technology to help solve the intelligence problems;

(5) The technical capabilities required begin with electronic mail within and among agencies and analysts, at a minimum, and progress through limited database access and document publishing, and culminate with real-time collaboration, eliminating geographic barriers by using audio, video, and direct access to databases under strictly controlled circumstances; and,

(6) The key technical connections across the drug intelligence community to provide for information exchange can be improved using current technologies—no further research or development is necessary to implement the initial architecture.

Traditionally, drug intelligence and law enforcement organizations at all levels have developed information systems to meet their own specific requirements, resulting in a proliferation of information systems that are essentially "stovepipes." Major drug intelligence centers, in particular the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), have very limited access to law enforcement data. The counterdrug community can maximize the efficiency of the intelligence process by adopting a systems architecture that places the relevant information into a series of interoperable "accessible information spaces," with respect for need-to-know and proper authorization to access information. The creation of shared information spaces will make community-wide electronic access a reality, providing analysts the flexibility to interact with, and gather information from, other organizations. It will also provide the technical foundation for the timely and secure dissemination of intelligence to appropriate customers.

This systems architecture will provide a mechanism for appropriate state and local personnel to interact electronically with one another and their Federal law enforcement counterparts in a secure environment. The goal is to enable all of the drug intelligence analysts with the appropriate credentials to obtain all of the information they need to do their jobs. There is no intent to enable, nor will the system permit, personnel without appropriate clearances to access national security databases, or Intelligence Community analysts to directly access domestic criminal investigative data.

Advances in communications technology have removed most of the technical barriers to information sharing, while also improving methods of protecting information. Technical security measures such as encryption, smart cards, public-private key infrastructures, Internet protocol security standards, biometrics, and firewalls can be used to prevent unauthorized access, allowing network administrators and security professionals to

enforce the standards of need-to-know. The technical means exist for the drug intelligence community to share information securely, but the connecting hardware and software must be widely available throughout participating agencies. Departmental and agency procedures should be reviewed to ensure that they facilitate secure information sharing.

This Plan envisions a future systems architecture that is both secure enough to support information sharing and easily accessible from across the drug intelligence community. The goal is to ensure that all drug intelligence and law enforcement personnel can obtain expeditiously all of the information they have been cleared to receive and need to know. It promotes the use of existing networks and secure Web technology to connect the drug intelligence community. The technical components include more robust, timely, and accurate input into agency databases; adherence to strict security with audit trails; proactive dissemination of non-case-specific law enforcement information to the broader drug intelligence community; single-workstation access to multiple sources of law enforcement and intelligence information; and funding for adequate technical support, life-cycle enhancements, training, user support, and analytic tools.

This section provides 10 specific action items that will create the basis for an effective drug intelligence systems architecture.

F-1. Establish a Systems Policy Review Group (SPRG): To ensure that broad systems standards are developed to guide law enforcement and intelligence agencies, the Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating Group (CDICG) will establish an SPRG to advise it and help the participating departments and agencies in accomplishing the six initial goals:

(1) Develop common criteria and define architectural and data standards for drug information-sharing systems focusing on the counterdrug Intelligence Community, the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), and NDIC;

(2) Ensure consistency with laws and policies concerning privacy and civil liberties. Information sharing will follow the security, privacy, and technological standards determined for the Global Justice Information Network (Global). The CDICG, based on the recommendations of the SPRG, will consider the advantages of any new data access and transfer initiatives, and the possible legal and policy reasons not to undertake particular proposed initiatives;

(3) Facilitate electronic connectivity among Federal drug law enforcement personnel;

(4) Facilitate electronic connectivity among regional, state, and local drug law enforcement personnel;

(5) Address the policy concerns limiting connectivity between Federal and regional, state, and local personnel; and,

(6) Support agency initiatives to automate case files at an accelerated rate.

F-2. Use Existing Information to Create a Detailed Schedule for Implementing the Drug Law Enforcement Intelligence Architecture: The SPRG, working with the Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat (CDX) and other experts, will expedite the development of an initial architecture plan and a detailed schedule for its implementation. Concurrent with the SPRG architecture effort, the participating Departments and agencies should begin to plan and budget for the technology enhancements defined in the Action Items listed below. The development of the architecture will take advantage of recent Justice Department studies, the plans for the Intelligence Community Collaborative Operations Network, the creation of the Global Justice Information Network (Global), the Defense Department's Global Information Grid, and other ongoing initiatives in this area.

The planning effort will also take advantage of the conceptual model for information technology architecture (ITA) created under the auspices of the Chief Information Officer (CIO) Council of the Federal Government. The Council has created a common set of terminology and definitions that are appropriate for the drug intelligence information technology architecture effort. The CDICG will ensure that the CIOs are cognizant of the ongoing efforts of the SPRG.

At a minimum, the plan must take the following factors into consideration:

(1) Information requirements and capabilities—this includes determining which organizations require the various types of information and identifying which organizations have that information available;

(2) Barriers to information sharing—this includes identifying and seeking resolution to impediments to secure information sharing at the international, Federal, regional, state, and local levels; and,

(3) Candidates for interconnection at the same level of security:

(a) Top Secret—future efforts within the Intelligence Community to augment the existing Intelink;

(b) Secret—FBINET, EPIC Internal System, and the NDIC internal network with the ADNET (DEA Merlin already connects);

(c) Sensitive But Unclassified—Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS), DEA Firebird, U.S. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Information System (LEIS), RISSNET, and certain systems on National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS);

(d) Unclassified—High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Information Systems Network (ISN) and other secure and non-secure systems operating on the Internet; and,

(e) Alternatives for connecting systems that operate at different security levels—the Counternarcotics Command Management System (CNCMS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) currently operate systems with limited connectivity between Unclassified and Secret systems. The technology, policies, and procedures that enable this type of connectivity will be examined for broader application.

F-3. Extend Secure Connectivity Among Federal Drug Intelligence Personnel: It is critical that the drug intelligence personnel at all Federal law enforcement agencies and centers have the ability to contact and collaborate securely with their counterparts, and that capability should be available at their desktop workstations. The Federal law enforcement community should significantly expand electronic connectivity among its intelligence analysts. Each analyst must be provided with the appropriate hardware and services (ranging from simple e-mail connectivity and Internet access to real-time, multimedia collaboration) at the appropriate level of security (ranging from Unclassified to Top Secret).

F-4. Accelerate Federal Law Enforcement Automation Initiatives: The Departments of Justice and Treasury, and Federal law enforcement agencies, will accelerate, to the extent possible, multiyear initiatives upon which they are already embarked that will automate their future reporting and case file systems and convert their active case paper files initiated within the past 10 years. Currently, within the Department of Justice, DEA, FBI, and other components each have their own messaging, case file, and database systems. In Treasury, the U.S. Customs Service, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)-Criminal Investigations, and other components have their own messaging, case file, and database systems. The databases are mainly indices of individuals with references to supporting case files. The indices also serve as pointers to, and case deconfliction systems for, agents. Case and drug intelligence reporting remain paper intensive, with much of the information located in hardcopy case files at agency field offices.

F-5. Expand Connectivity of NDPIX: All appropriate Federal law enforcement agencies, to include DEA, FBI, U.S. Customs Service, U.S. Marshals, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Border Patrol, plan to participate in the NDPIX system within two years. Expanded connectivity and automation will also be used to accelerate the input of state-level data. The architectural plan will address other requirements for NDPIX, such as a simultaneous input capability for NDPIX and RISSNET.

F-6. Provide Information Technology Support to NDIC: To the degree funds become available:

(1) Provide secure Internet-type connectivity to other counterdrug centers at the Unclassified level, as well as to CDX for administrative communications, and, in coordination with the Justice Training Center, develop and deliver on-site and video distance learning-based drug analysis education and training;
(2) Provide Secret connectivity from the analysts' desktops to ADNET via secure firewall;
(3) Improve access to multiple (and additional) databases via desktop PCs, including direct access to participating agencies' online databases and report transmission systems;
(4) Provide electronic collaboration capability to NDIC and the Intelligence Community for the purpose of better coordinating annual drug threat assessments and the integration of foreign and domestic strategic drug intelligence analyses;
(5) Provide the necessary systems connectivity for NDIC to coordinate and manage an online national drug intelligence library and make it available to the counterdrug community; and,
(6) Provide a method and establish parameters by which to enter Document Exploitation (DOCEX) information into NDIC and agency databases.

F-7. Provide Information Technology Support to EPIC: To the degree funds become available:

(1) Provide secure Internet-type connectivity to other counterdrug centers, as well as to CDX, at the Unclassified level for administrative communications;
(2) Provide Secret-level connectivity from EPIC analysts' desktops to ADNET via a secure firewall;
(3) Upgrade the EPIC Watch by augmenting the current telephonic inquiry system with a system that allows posting of electronic database inquiries via RISSNET, NLETS, and other appropriately secure systems;
(4) Provide technological connectivity to improve the ease by which state and local law enforcement components can request EPIC services;
(5) Make the FinCEN-sponsored Suspicious Activity Reports System (SARS) database available for searches by appropriate EPIC personnel;
(6) Develop a systematic process for state and local law enforcement agencies to collect and report area drug seizure data to EPIC for national tabulation; and,
(7) Receive Federal U.S. District Court indictment information via the Justice Consolidated Office Network (JCON) or other available means.

F-8. Provide Information Technology Support to FinCEN: To the degree funds become available:

(1) Provide secure Internet-type connectivity to other counterdrug centers, including CDX, at the Unclassified level for administrative communications;
(2) Provide secure collaboration capability to FinCEN, other Federal law enforcement agencies, and the Intelligence Community for the purpose of producing interagency illicit financial activities assessments; and,

(3) Provide FinCEN analysts with improved direct and timely access to Intelligence Community reporting on known or suspected drug-related financial transactions;

F-9. Develop HIDTA Intelligence Centers Systems Standards: ONDCP and the Departments of Justice and Treasury, in coordination with CDX and the Global initiative, will develop minimum systems standards for HIDTA Intelligence Centers, including:

(1) Wide-area network connectivity between each HIDTA Intelligence Center and the member agencies they serve, including analytic tools, e-mail, Web access, and collaboration capabilities;

(2) The identification of, and adherence to, compatible systems standards across HIDTAs to ensure information-sharing capability;

(3) The need for baseline systems in each HIDTA Intelligence Center (for example, ADNET, NDPIX, and event and case deconfliction systems);

(4) Connectivity between each HIDTA Intelligence Center and its RISS;

(5) Enhanced electronic connectivity from HIDTA Intelligence Centers to Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and national centers;

(6) Methods for timely pointer information entry into NDPIX; and,

(7) A photo-imaging network capability that will permit Federal, state, and local jurisdictions to share arrest photographs and biographic data for arrestees in the area. These efforts should comport with the National Crime Information Center 2000 and the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System planned to provide digital photo imaging capability.

F-10. Improve Personnel Development and Training:

(1) Provide means for the Justice Training Center to collaborate with Treasury's Federal Law Enforcement Center, the HIDTA Assistance Center, the Joint Military Intelligence Training Center, the interagency Training for Intelligence and Law Enforcement Program, NDIC, and other national centers; and,

(2) Develop a long-distance learning network (with video teleconference training capability) for the JTC.

Appendix A:
Methodology Used to Develop the General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan

In 1997, the Departments of Defense, Justice, State, Transportation, and Treasury; the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) collaborated to begin an interagency review of the counterdrug intelligence architecture, for example, the roles, missions, and interagency relationships of the departments and agencies with counterdrug intelligence programs and responsibilities. The review was made in four phases:

Phase 1

In July 1997, a sub-Cabinet-level Interagency Committee initiated the Phase 1 inventory of organizations involved in the counterdrug intelligence architecture, their general functions and capabilities, and their interrelationships. The Phase 1 inventory, compiled under the auspices of ONDCP, was used in the Phase 2 evaluative review.

Phase 2

In September 1997, the participating departments provided representatives to a review team to evaluate and make recommendations to improve the counterdrug intelligence architecture. In December 1997, the Director of ONDCP, the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) designated the 12-person review team as the White House Task Force on the Coordination of Counterdrug Intelligence Centers and Activities. The Task Force Review primarily focused on the drug-related information-sharing and intelligence components of the:

- **National-level centers with counterdrug intelligence responsibilities**, specifically, the:
  --National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC)
  --El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC)
  --Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
  --DCI Crime and Narcotics Center

- **Major interagency counterdrug intelligence activities**, including:
  --Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)-East
  --JIATF-West
  --JIATF-South
  --Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Special Operations Division (comprising DEA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and U.S. Customs Service (USCS))

- **Major agency counterdrug intelligence activities**, including the counterdrug intelligence activities of the:
  --Defense Intelligence Agency
  --Drug Enforcement Administration
  --Federal Bureau of Investigation
  --National Security Agency
  --Office of Naval Intelligence
  --United States Coast Guard
  --United States Customs Service

- **Major Federally-funded task force and partnership programs**, specifically, the:
  --Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force program
  --High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) program
  --Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) program

The Task Force visited more than 250 elements in 10 countries, 19 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico; 15 of 20 HIDTAs; the three JIATFs and Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6); and four of six RISS Centers.

NDIC was a prime focus of the Task Force review.[1] The entire Task Force visited NDIC and EPIC to evaluate the roles of these centers in the counterdrug intelligence system and their ability to accomplish their drug analysis missions.

Phase 3

The Task Force incorporated many departmental comments into its final report of observations and recommendations. All comments were appended to the final report. On 23 July 1998, the Task Force submitted its final report to ONDCP and the Interagency Committee. The Task Force was then disbanded. The Director of ONDCP distributed the final report to the participating components to inform them about the process for preparing this Plan.

[1] The Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act of 1998 specified that the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) be included in the plan to be submitted by the Director of ONDCP. In addition, conference committee report language, accompanying Section 104(e) of the 1998 Intelligence Authorization Act, stated that the Director's counterdrug intelligence architecture review:

> "…should describe current and proposed efforts to structure the NDIC to effectively coordinate and consolidate strategic drug intelligence from national security and law enforcement agencies. It should also describe what steps have been taken to ensure that the relevant national security and law enforcement agencies are providing the NDIC with access to data needed to accomplish this task."

Phase 4

Using the Task Force report as a basis, an interagency working group was established to formulate the required plan to improve coordination and eliminate unnecessary duplication among the Federal counterdrug intelligence centers and activities. The Group identified major issues from the Task Force report for interagency deliberation and resolution, and prepared the draft General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) for formal interagency coordination. Following interagency clearance, the GCIP was submitted to the President for approval and transmittal to Congress.

Appendix B:
White House Task Force Authorities

Section 639 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-61, Coordination of Counterdrug Intelligence Centers and Activities):

(1) Not later than 120 days after the date of enactment of the Act, the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, including the Committees on Appropriations, a plan to improve coordination, and eliminate unnecessary duplication, among the counterdrug intelligence centers and counterdrug activities of the Federal Government, including the centers and activities of the following departments and agencies:

(A) The Department of Defense, including the Defense Intelligence Agency.
(B) The Department of the Treasury, including the United States Customs Service and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN).
(C) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(D) The Coast Guard.
(E) The Department of Justice, including the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC); the Drug Enforcement Administration, including the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC); and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(2) The purpose of the plan under paragraph (1) is to maximize the effectiveness of centers and activities referred to in that paragraph in achieving the objectives of the national drug control strategy. In order to maximize such effectiveness, the plan shall—

(A) articulate clear and specific mission statements for each counterdrug intelligence center and activity, including the manner in which responsibility for counterdrug intelligence activities will be allocated among the counterdrug intelligence centers;
(B) specify the relationship between such centers;
(C) specify the means by which proper oversight of such centers will be assured;
(D) specify the means by which counterdrug intelligence will be forwarded effectively to all levels of officials responsible for United States counterdrug policy; and
(E) specify mechanisms to ensure that state and local law enforcement agencies are apprised of counterdrug intelligence acquired by Federal law enforcement agencies in a manner which—
  (i) facilitates effective counterdrug activities by State and local law enforcement agencies; and
  (ii) provides such State and local law enforcement agencies with the information relating to the safety of officials involved in their counterdrug activities.

(b) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees means the following:

(1) The Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Judiciary, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

(2) The Committee on International Relations, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

1998 INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT, Section 104(e) and Accompanying Conference Committee Report Language

Sec. 104 (e) NATIONAL DRUG INTELLIGENCE CENTER -

(1) IN GENERAL - Of the amount authorized to be appropriated in subsection (a), the amount of $27,000,000 shall be available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within such amount, funds provided for research, development, test, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until September 30, 1999, and funds provided for procurement purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2000.

(2) TRANSFER OF FUNDS - The Director of Central Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General of the United States funds available for the National Drug Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so transferred for the activities of the Center.

(3) LIMITATION - Amounts available for the Center may not be used in contravention of the provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)).

(4) AUTHORITY - Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the operations of the Center.

PERTINENT CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT LANGUAGE:

Section 104 of the conference report authorizes appropriations for the Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence.

Subsection (e) authorizes $27,000,000 of the amount authorized in subsection (a) to be made available for the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC). This subsection is identical to subsection (e) in the House amendment. The Senate bill had no similar provision. The Senate recedes. The managers agree that continued funding of the NDIC from the NFIP deserves considerable study and many remain concerned that the balance between law enforcement and national security equities in the NDIC's operations is

skewed in favor of the law enforcement community. This is due, in part, to placement of the NDIC within the Department of Justice.

The managers urge the President to carefully examine this problem and report to the Committees before April 1, 1998. This examination should be undertaken and reported as a part of the National Counter Narcotics Architecture Review currently being prepared by the Office of National Drug Control Policy. The report should describe current and proposed efforts to structure the NDIC to effectively coordinate and consolidate strategic drug intelligence from national security and law enforcement agencies. It should also describe what steps have been taken to ensure that the relevant national security and law enforcement agencies are providing the NDIC with access to data needed to accomplish this task. The managers agree that upon receipt of this report the intelligence committees will reconsider whether it is appropriate to continue funding the NDIC as a part of the National Foreign Intelligence Program.

Appendix C:
Missions of Counterdrug Intelligence Centers and Activities

The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC)

The mission of CNC is to oversee the development, coordination, and implementation of all counternarcotics activities within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In close collaboration with all relevant law enforcement, policymaking, and Department of Defense (DoD) counternarcotics elements, CNC is responsible for the prioritization, responsiveness, and efficient use of counternarcotics resources throughout the Intelligence Community, and for ensuring that foreign intelligence priorities are closely coordinated with those of domestic law enforcement.

Through the melding of analytic, operational, and technical expertise from several agencies, CNC provides a full range of multidisciplinary, current, and long-term intelligence to support policymakers and all components of the U.S. counterdrug community. The Center's analytic program addresses all dimensions of the international narcotics problem and provides intelligence to support the development and implementation of U.S. counternarcotics policy. CNC provides actionable intelligence to support CIA, law enforcement, and DoD operations to disrupt and dismantle major foreign drug organizations and to detect, monitor, and interdict drug flows. CNC also assesses drug flows to the United States and is responsible for estimating annual cultivation and production for all major coca- and opium-producing countries worldwide and for cannabis crops in selected countries. The Center is also responsible for ensuring that all relevant technologies are brought to bear in supporting counternarcotics analytic, collection, and operational efforts throughout the counterdrug Intelligence Community.

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Counterdrug Analysis

The mission of DIA's Office for Counterdrug Analysis (TWD) is to manage and coordinate DIA's counterdrug intelligence support. The office oversees DoD counterdrug intelligence production and dissemination activities. It provides comprehensive DoD plans for analysis, production, and dissemination of drug intelligence. TWD produces a broad range of products on drug issues worldwide, primarily in support of DoD missions. It participates in developing Intelligence Community estimates and products under the direction of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the DCI Crime and Narcotics Center, and actively participates in existing intercommunity counterdrug coordination processes. In conjunction with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), TWD sponsors the DOMINANT CHRONICLE Project, providing translation, exploitation, and community dissemination of captured foreign records relating to the illegal drug business.

TWD produces finished strategic intelligence on foreign trafficking organizations and their vulnerabilities; develops trend and pattern analysis of air, maritime, and land movements of drugs; and analyzes foreign military policies, involvement in trafficking,

corruption of high-level officials, and links between terrorism and the drug trade. TWD serves as the executive agent for the production of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP)-sponsored *Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement*.

TWD provides a broad range of operational intelligence in support of the military commander's counterdrug missions, the detection and monitoring mission of the Joint Interagency Task Forces, and the activities of Federal drug law enforcement agencies overseas. TWD provides counterdrug intelligence support through appropriate channels or established programs to host country military services. TWD provides intelligence analyst support in response to approved U.S. Mission requirements, as well as provides intelligence analyst support to Commander in Chief (CINC)-deployed analytic teams, such as Tactical Analysis Teams (TATs).

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Intelligence Program

As the lead Federal agency for drug law enforcement, the DEA goal is to significantly reduce the availability of illegal and diverted drugs in the United States. To achieve this goal, DEA intelligence elements provide leadership strategies and comprehensive programs to support drug law enforcement and intelligence efforts worldwide. These programs consist of strategic, investigative, and tactical intelligence support, innovative database enhancements, improved information-sharing and dissemination, and enhanced interagency cooperation, to include expanded interaction with the Intelligence Community, the U.S. military, and Federal, state, and local authorities. DEA's intelligence program utilizes drug intelligence from these agencies in addition to DEA-acquired information and develops programs that allow the strengths and resources of each agency to most effectively support U.S. counterdrug efforts. The DEA Intelligence Division also has responsibility for the coordination and review of interagency drug intelligence initiatives, as well as significant management, policy, and liaison functions. The Intelligence Division will continue to:

- Produce reports on the major drug trafficking organizations, using information obtained through the Special Operations Division and other sources; and,
- Produce strategic and investigative reports on foreign and domestic drug-related issues.

Individual law enforcement agencies will continue to be responsible for coordinating support to their investigations in both the domestic and foreign arenas.

El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC)

Previous Mission Statement: The El Paso Intelligence Center is to provide a comprehensive, accurate intelligence picture of illicit drug movement by land, sea, and air throughout the world as it relates to the United States; to provide tactical intelligence support through the exchange of time-sensitive information related to illicit drug

movement; and, to support other programs of interest to EPIC member agencies, such as alien smuggling and weapons trafficking.

New Mission Statement: The El Paso Intelligence Center will support United States law enforcement and interdiction components through the timely analysis and dissemination of intelligence on illicit drug and alien movements, and criminal organizations responsible for these illegal activities, within the United States, on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border, across the Caribbean, and from other points of origin within the Western Hemisphere en route to the United States.

Federal Bureau of Investigation, Criminal Intelligence Section (FBI)

The mission of the FBI Criminal Intelligence Section is to collect and analyze existing information from within the FBI, as well as from other Federal law enforcement and Intelligence Community agencies, and public sources. The goal of the criminal intelligence capability is to provide evaluated intelligence in support of national criminal investigations at all levels, Federal, state, and local. The FBI's intelligence capability is not just reactive, but proactive as well. The FBI identifies national criminal threats through Racketeering Enterprise Investigations, criminal informant coverage, liaison contacts, and the analytic capabilities at FBI Headquarters and in the 57 Field Offices. Consistent with the *National Drug Control Strategy*, timely and accurate information will help the FBI to uncover trafficker and criminal organization vulnerabilities and intentions, fill intelligence gaps, and fully support national investigations.

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)

Previous Mission Statement: The mission of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network is to support and strengthen domestic and international anti-money laundering efforts and to foster interagency and global cooperation to that end through information collection, analysis and sharing, technological assistance, and innovative and cost-effective implementation of Treasury authorities.

New Mission Statement: The mission of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network is to support law enforcement investigative efforts and foster interagency and global cooperation against domestic and international financial crimes; and to provide U.S. policymakers with strategic analyses of domestic and worldwide money-laundering developments, trends, and patterns. FinCEN will work toward those ends through information collection, analysis, and sharing, technological assistance, and innovative and cost-effective implementation of Treasury authorities.

High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA)

The mission of the HIDTA program is to enhance and coordinate America's drug control efforts among Federal, state, and local agencies in order to eliminate or reduce drug trafficking (including the production, manufacture, transportation, distribution, and chronic use of illegal drugs and money laundering) and its harmful consequences in critical areas of the United States.

Pursuant to the Anti-drug abuse Act of 1988 as amended, the HIDTAs, as designated by ONDCP, are the most critical drug trafficking areas of the United States.* The Executive Committee of each HIDTA is composed of representatives from local, state, and Federal agencies. Each Executive Committee receives a charter from the Director of ONDCP to reduce trafficking activities, particularly those that adversely affect other areas of the country.

The mission of the HIDTA Intelligence Centers is to facilitate the timely exchange of information from Federal, state, local, commercial, and HIDTA databases with HIDTA initiatives and participating agencies. Strategic and tactical intelligence is disseminated in support of drug distribution, money-laundering, firearms trafficking, and drug-related violence investigations.

*These are the current HIDTAs:

Appalachia
Arizona
Atlanta
California
Central Florida
Central Valley, CA
Chicago
Gulf Coast
Hawaii
Houston
Lake County
Los Angeles
Midwest
Milwaukee
New England
New Mexico
New York
Northern California
North Texas
Northwest
Ohio
Oregon
Philadelphia/Camden
Puerto Rico/Virgin Islands
Rocky Mountain
South Florida
South Texas
Southern Michigan
Southwest Border
Washington-Baltimore
West Texas

Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)-East

(NOTE: The mission of JIATF-East was expanded in 1999 to include JIATF-South.)

JIATF-East is situated in Key West, FL, and functions as a subordinate of the U.S. military's Miami-based Southern Command. The JIATF-East area of responsibility includes the Caribbean, together with its associated island nations, and the waters off South and Central America (less Mexico's Pacific coast). JIATF-East/J2 Intelligence Directorate provides operational, all-source, 24-hour-per-day fused intelligence support to: DoD TATs, in U.S. Missions; U.S. drug law enforcement agencies; DoD detection and monitoring forces; and foreign military and drug law enforcement agencies operating within the JIATF-East area of responsibility. The principal recipient of JIATF-East intelligence is the JIATF-East Joint Operations Command Center, although most reports are routinely provided to other agencies and departments for their use. The Joint Operations Command Center is the only joint interagency counterdrug operations and intelligence facility providing tactically actionable intelligence products to deployed international or interagency counterdrug forces operating in the JIATF-East transit zone area of responsibility.

Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)-South

(NOTE: The mission of JIATF-South was absorbed in 1999 by JIATF-East.)

The mission of JIATF-South in 1998 was to execute U.S. national counterdrug policy by supporting U.S. Federal agency and participating nation counterdrug efforts to deter, degrade, and disrupt the production and transshipment of illegal drugs within and from the JIATF-South area of responsibility. The JIATF-South J2 provided intelligence support to the JIATF-South mission. The intelligence directorate was responsible for the planning, collection management, analysis, intelligence fusion, and dissemination of all-source intelligence in support of regional and in-country counterdrug operations. It also was responsible for 24-hour intelligence watch support to surveillance and reconnaissance operations, and direction of all Tactical Analysis Teams assigned to U.S. Embassies in Panama and South America.

Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)-West

JIATF-West is situated in Alameda, CA, and functions as a subordinate of the U.S. military's Honolulu, Hawaii-based Pacific Command. The JIATF-West area of responsibility extends from the waters off Mexico's Pacific coast to Southeast Asia and parts of Southwest Asia. JIATF-West brings DoD forces to bear in support of law enforcement agencies and U.S. Missions in Southeast and Southwest Asia in their efforts to disrupt international drug trafficking and coordinates with JIATF-East on activities in the eastern Pacific and near Mexico. JIATF-West operates a 24-hour-per-day all-source intelligence analysis function for coordination of tactical and operational intelligence support to U.S. Mission counterdrug operations in the Pacific area of responsibility.

National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC)

Previous Mission Statement: The mission of the National Drug Intelligence Center is to coordinate and consolidate strategic organizational drug intelligence from national security and law enforcement agencies in order to produce assessments and analyses regarding the structure, membership, finances, communication, transportation, logistics, and other activities of drug trafficking organizations.

New Mission Statement: The mission of the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) is:

- To support national policy decision makers with timely strategic domestic drug intelligence assessments, focusing on the production, consumption, and trafficking trends and patterns of all illicit drugs inside U.S. national borders and territories.

- To help the Intelligence Community guide and prioritize its counterdrug effort, it will provide to the originating law enforcement agency, or with the permission of the originating agency, foreign-related investigative leads discovered in its domestic analyses.

- To produce an annual National Drug Threat Assessment, to produce or coordinate interagency regional drug threat assessments, and to participate in other joint counterdrug assessments involving the integration of foreign and domestic drug information.

Office of Naval Intelligence-212 (ONI-212)

ONI-212 provides unique maritime-focused analysis of drug trafficking entities and conveyances in support of the *National Drug Control Strategy*. The division brings one-of-a-kind sources of information, databases, and analytic experience to bear on the detection, monitoring, and interdiction of maritime drug trafficking. Beyond providing access via the Anti-Drug Network (ADNET) to ONI maritime databases (SEALINK), ONI provides support in the following:

- Finished intelligence and ad hoc support on foreign commercial maritime facilities, conveyances, companies, and activities;
- Technical and operational-level intelligence reporting against non-commercial maritime conveyances and organizations; and,
- Investigation and application of new maritime-related data sources for the counterdrug community.

The majority of ONI tailored support is provided directly to law enforcement agencies' field and regional intelligence offices and headquarters elements. Other significant consumers include the Joint Interagency Task Forces, forces from the U.S. Navy, U.S.

Coast Guard, cooperating foreign nations, Tactical Analysis Teams in Latin America, and existing intercommunity counterdrug coordination processes.

Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) Law Enforcement Program

The mission of the RISS is to enhance the ability of local, state, and Federal law enforcement agencies (LEAs) to identify, target, and remove criminal conspirators, and to support investigative and prosecution efforts which span multi-jurisdictional boundaries involving narcotics trafficking, organized crime, criminal gangs, and violent crime.

Program Description: RISS is divided into six regions and comprises more than 5,000 local, state, and Federal LEAs. It is funded by DOJ's Bureau of Justice Assistance and supplemented by annual membership fees.

Although RISS projects focus on the overall mission noted above, each project is allowed to focus on its choice of multi-jurisdictional crimes to target and its range of services (for example, data analysis, investigative support, equipment sharing, training, and technical assistance) to offer. Each RISS contains a centralized database of criminal records and all RISS members are connected by a secure, unclassified Wide Area Network.

- ***Middle Atlantic-Great Lakes Organized Crime Law Enforcement Network (MAGLOCLEN)*** - It includes Delaware, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, the District of Columbia, and two provinces in Canada. MAGLOCLEN focuses on organized criminal activity, criminal gangs, and violent crime.

- ***Mid-States Organized Crime Center (MOCIC)*** - It includes Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North and South Dakota, and Wisconsin. MOCIC focuses on narcotics trafficking, professional traveling criminals, organized crime, criminal gangs, and violent crime.

- ***New England State Police Information Network (NESPIN)*** - It includes Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont. NESPIN focuses on narcotics trafficking, organized crime, major criminal activity, criminal gangs, and violent crime.

- ***Regional Organized Crime Information Center (ROCIC)*** - It includes Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North and South Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Puerto Rico. ROCIC focuses on narcotics violators, professional traveling criminals, organized crime, criminal gangs, and violent crime.

- ***Rocky Mountain Information Network (RMIN)*** - It includes Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming, and Canada. RMIN focuses on narcotics violators, associated criminal activity, criminal gangs, and violent crime.

- ***Western States Information Network (WSIN)*** - It includes Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington. WSIN focuses on narcotics, narcotics trafficking, and criminal organizations and activities.

U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center (CGICC)

The mission of the U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center is to produce and disseminate information derived from all sources to support Coast Guard planning and operations in all agency mission areas in addition to counterdrug, and to ensure the adequacy of Coast Guard intelligence support to other government agencies. CGICC inserts Coast Guard requirements into the national collections systems processes and validates national requirements for Coast Guard collection. CGICC is the Coast Guard representative on interagency assessments and is the designated center for exploitation of imagery to support maritime interdiction and detection and monitoring operations.

U.S. Customs Service, Intelligence Division

The Intelligence Division is the cornerstone of the new Customs Intelligence System. The mission of the Customs Intelligence System is to unify and integrate the diverse but interconnected intelligence components of the U.S. Customs Service. This system includes managing the intelligence process in support of U.S. Customs Service policy, core processes, and law enforcement. The fundamental goal of the Intelligence System is the production and dissemination of tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence. The vision of the Intelligence System is to provide excellence in intelligence support in the face of ever-expanding windows of opportunity for criminal organizations in a changing world.

Appendix D:
Glossary of Terms

ACS	Automated Case Support System; provides access to all Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) databases.
ADNET	AntiDrug Network; a secure information network connecting selected military, law enforcement, and intelligence counterdrug components.
CDICG	Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating Group.
CDX	Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat.
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations.
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency.
CINC	Commander in Chief; a Department of Defense (DoD) term for the military officer in charge of one of the United States regional or strategic military commands.
CIO	Chief Information Officer.
CISP	Criminal Intelligence Support Program; an FBI searchable database.
CNC	Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Crime and Narcotics Center; the element of the Central Intelligence Agency responsible for counterdrug intelligence support.
CNCMS	Counternarcotics Command Management System; a secure USSOUTHCOM communications system.
CNII	Committee on Narcotics Intelligence Issues; an Intelligence Community committee.
CN-IWG	Counter-Narcotics Interagency Working Group; an Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) committee.
CONVOY	An El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC)-based domestic drug interdiction training program.
COPS	Community Oriented Policing Services; a Department of Justice (DOJ)-funded activity.
CY	Calendar year.

DCI	Director of Central Intelligence; the cabinet position occupied by the Director, CIA, through which he exercises oversight and direction of the Intelligence Community.
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration.
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency.
DOCEX	Document Exploitation; the extraction of information from records obtained during an investigation.
DoD	Department of Defense.
DOJ	Department of Justice.
EAB	Executive Advisory Board; previously provided intelligence production guidance to the National Drug Intelligence Center.
EPIC	El Paso Intelligence Center; a DEA-administered, multi-agency law enforcement support activity; located in El Paso, Texas.
FDIN	Federal Drug Interdiction Number; a unique number assigned to a drug seizure.
FDSS	Federal-wide Drug Seizure System; administered by DEA to monitor drug seizures.
FinCEN	Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; a component of the Department of Treasury; located in Vienna, Virginia.
FLETC	Federal Law Enforcement Training Center; a component of the Department of Treasury; located in Glynco, Georgia.
FY	Fiscal year; the Federal fiscal year is 1 October through 30 September.
GCIP	General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan.
GIG	Global Information Grid.
Global	Global Justice Information Network; a DOJ automation initiative.
GS	Government Service.
HIDTA	High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area; an ONDCP-designated area.

HIFCA	High-Risk Money-Laundering and Related Financial Crimes Area; identified in the 1999 Money Laundering Strategy.
IC	Intelligence Community; a term that includes: CIA, DIA, the National Security Agency (NSA), the offices within DoD for the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, the intelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, the FBI, the Department of the Treasury and the Department of Energy, and the Staff elements of the Director of Central Intelligence.
ICON	Intelligence Community Collaborative Operations Network; an Intelligence Community automation initiative.
INS	Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice.
intelligence	As used in this document, a generic term referring to information related to subjects of interest to a government agency. When used to refer to either Intelligence Community or law enforcement community intelligence, the context in which it is used is critical to its intended meaning, as each community uses the same word to mean different things, often resulting in communications problems. Intelligence Community "intelligence" is information resulting specifically from Intelligence Community collection actions and relating to the capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign powers, organizations, or persons (Executive Order 12333). Law enforcement "intelligence," also referred to as investigative information, is sensitive information that is part of a law enforcement inquiry, matter, or case, usually developed as a byproduct of law enforcement investigative and interdiction efforts and subject to being divulged, as required, to support the arrest and prosecution of the subject(s) of the investigation.
IPB	Intelligence Priorities Board; previously provided intelligence production prioritization to the National Drug Intelligence Center.
IPSEC	Internet Protocol Security standards.
IRS	Internal Revenue Service, Department of Treasury.
ISN	Information Systems Network.
IT	Information Technology.
ITA	Information Technology Architecture.

JCON	Justice Consolidated Office Network; a DOJ-managed automation initiative.
JETWAY	An EPIC-based domestic drug interdiction training program.
JIATF-E	Joint Interagency Task Force-East; a military and law enforcement operational coordination activity in Key West, Florida.
JIATF-W	Joint Interagency Task Force-West; a military and law enforcement operational coordination activity in Alameda, California.
JICC	Joint Information Coordination Center; an EPIC-based initiative designed to consolidate information on suspect aircraft and maritime craft.
JICLE	Joint Intelligence Community/Law Enforcement working group; legal policy guidelines and procedures approved in 1997 by the DCI and the Department of Justice regarding coordination between the intelligence and law enforcement communities.
JTC	Justice Training Center, Quantico, Virginia.
JWICS	Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System; a DoD-managed secure telecommunications network.
LEA	Law Enforcement Agency.
LEIS	Law Enforcement Intelligence System; an automated information system operated by the U.S. Coast Guard.
MORE	Making Officer Redeployment Effective; a DOJ-funded initiative.
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding.
NADDIS	Narcotics And Dangerous Drugs Information System; a DEA-maintained automated data base.
NDIC	National Drug Intelligence Center; a component of the Department of Justice located in Johnstown, Pennsylvania.
NDPIX	National Drug Pointer Index; an interagency automated data base that provides Federal, state, and local law enforcement officers with pointer information relative to active drug targets.
NLETS	National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System; a combined Federal and state communications network.

NSC	National Security Council.
NSDD	National Security Decision Directive.
OCDETF	Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force.
ONDCP	Office of National Drug Control Policy.
ONI	Office of Naval Intelligence.
Operational	As used in this document, this is highly perishable raw or analyzed information derived from any source that supports immediate interdiction or law enforcement actions.
PACOM	Pacific Command; a U.S. military regional headquarters based in Honolulu, Hawaii, responsible for directing and coordinating U.S. military activities in the Pacific in defense of the United States.
PCCN	President's Council on Counter-Narcotics.
PIPELINE	An EPIC-based domestic drug interdiction training program.
RISS	Regional Information Sharing System; a DOJ-funded system for sharing criminal information.
RISSNET	Regional Information Sharing System Network.
SARS	Suspicious Activity Report System; a bank reporting system used to identify potentially suspicious transactions.
SCI	Sensitive Compartmented Intelligence.
SES	Senior Executive Service.
SIS	Senior Intelligence Service.
SPRG	Systems Policy Review Group; reports to the CDICG.
Strategic	As used in this document, information that permits users at the highest levels of government to define a high-priority issue, identify and relate broad but pivotal issues, and understand the most significant elements so as to arrive at an informed decision.
Tactical	As used in this document, highly perishable raw or analyzed information, derived from any source, that supports immediate action.

TAT	Tactical Analysis Team; an intelligence activity located in some U.S. Missions, staffed by DoD personnel and designed to support the Mission staff.
TDY	Temporary Duty.
TECS	Treasury Enforcement Communication Systems; a U.S. Customs Service- and Immigration and Naturalization Service-maintained automated database.
TIC	The Interdiction Committee; an ONDCP interagency advisory group.
TILE	Training for Intelligence and Law Enforcement; promotes coordination and cross-training opportunities for drug specialists in the intelligence and law enforcement communities.
TWD	Transnational Warfare Counterdrug Analysis Office; the element of the Defense Intelligence Agency responsible for counterdrug intelligence support.
USIC	United States Interdiction Coordinator.
USSOUTH-COM	Southern Command; a U.S. military regional headquarters based in Miami, FL, and responsible for directing and coordinating U.S. military activities in Central and South America and the Caribbean in defense of the United States.
WAN	Wide Area Network.
WHTF	White House Task Force.

Appendix E:
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan
Action Items

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Access the General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan online at

www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/GCIP

For online information on Federal Departments and Agencies involved in drug policy, law enforcement, drug trafficking interdiction, and counterdrug intelligence issues, contact:

Department of Justice
www.usdoj.gov

Department of the Treasury
www.ustreas.gov

Department of Transportation
www.dot.gov

Office of National Drug Control Policy
www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov

Department of State
www.state.gov

Drug Enforcement Administration
www.usdoj.gov/dea/

Federal Bureau of Investigation
www.fbi.gov/

Internal Revenue Service
www.ustreas.gov/irs/ci/

United States Customs Service
www.customs.treas.gov

United States Coast Guard
www.uscg.mil

National Security Council
www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/nschome.html

For general drug information online contact:

The National Drug Control Strategy
www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/policy/99ndcs/contents.html

Drug Facts and Statistics
www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/drugfact/drugfact.html

Attachment “E”

Course Listing for Optimum Comprehensive Program

Optimum Basic Intelligence Analyst Training Program

The following is a list of topic areas/content which the CRC identified as being presented in the preferred Basic Intelligence Analyst Training Program. The hours are estimates of the time required to present the information. Not identified in this list is the hardware required, software required, contract for access to proprietary databases and analytical programs, as well as who can instruct this topical area.

Please review the attached list for completeness, and address other issue identified above. Indicate whether you could support the training program with students, instructors or other assistance. How many students would you send per year for the next three years? What other changes should be made to this program? Please provide your responses within the next two weeks if possible?

TITLE/TOPIC/CONTENT	**HRS**
Introduction to Training at the FLETC	20
Registration	
Uniform Issue/Turn In	
Physical Training - Walk/Run	
Ethics and Conduct	
EEO & Diversity	
Trauma Management/First Responder	
CPR	
Firearms Safety, Familiarization & Identification	
Graduation	
Role of Intelligence in Law Enforcement	2
Organization of Federal Law Enforcement Agencies	2
Introduction & Background to Intelligence	2
The Intelligence Cycle	6
The GITI Initiative	40
Interpretation of Information/Limitations	20
Report Writing & Mechanics of Writing -abstract & summary	4
Micro Computer Applications (MS Office Pro?)	40
Computer Security	1
Computer Forensics (bag & tag)	6
Handling Classified Material	1
Map reading and geography	2
Global Organized Criminal Activity and Terrorism	4
Country Culture	2
Briefing Techniques	8
Overview of the Law	20
Fraud Law (criminal statutes)	2
Law Exam	2
NCIC, TECS or Equivalent	2
Cyber Crimes & Intel Research/Collection (open source)	16

Case Management & Intel Reports	2
White Collar Crime Investigations	4
Open Sources of Information	20
Interviewing and Interrogation (collection) includes customer	10
Introduction to Surveillance/Counter-Surveillance	8
Financial - Money Laundering/Net Worth Investigations	12
Strategic Investigations: Outbound/Inbound	4
Human Exploitation	2
Crime Scene Investigations/Intelligence Collection	6
Charting Techniques of the Intelligence Cycle	10
Matrix's, Charts & Graphs	
Link Association Diagrams	
Commodity Flow Charting Techniques	
Event Charting Techniques	
Telephone Toll Charting	
Telephone Toll Analysis	4
Operational Security	1
Threat Assessments	4
Research for Final Oral/PE Research Paper	20
Final Oral PE & Graded Research Paper	16
Comprehensive Exams	6
I-2 Analysts Notebook	12
GIS - ARCView	8
Court Testimony	2
Moot Court	8

Attachment “F”

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